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1 Introduction
Since the 2008 crisis, access to credit, both in size and in quality, has been at the center of
the public attention. Subprimes mortgages, although by deﬁnition not consumption loans, seem
to have revealed a segmentation of the credit market, with on the one hand individuals who
have access to mainstream ﬁnancial services, i.e. those provided by limited set of legitimate
intermediaries : large commercial banks and their personal loan services. And "the other half"
[Baradaran, 2015], the unbanked, the excluded, those who have to resort to more expensive,
more stringent services, regrouped under the expression "fringe banking" - the realm of the "loan
shark"1. In diﬃcult times, some populations will eventually be pushed over to a more shadowy
economy, and into his rapacious clutches: the "loan shark" always stands as a luring presence
of the uncivilized, the ever so interest-driven, ready to prey upon the poor, the helpless, the
needy. Although the terms used to deﬁne this separation, the way it is described and the various
solutions oﬀered to mend it diﬀer, these descriptions all point to a correspondence between a social
segmentation, a two-tier credit system, and a moral divide between legitimate and illegitimate
1The point here is not to discuss the precise contemporary economic or social boundaries in the consumer
credit industry. Neither will we discuss the moving categories, often times contradictory expressions used to
describe them : "ﬁnancial exclusion", the "unbanked", "redlining", and so on, cover diﬀerent realities, and serve
diﬀerent purposes. Some aim at describing access to banking services, others access to credit ; some insist on
social or racial determinants, while others put more focus on behavioral considerations or ﬁnancial literacy issues.
A complete assessment of these account would be a laudable enterprise, yet for the purpose of the historical
research presented here, it is suﬃcient to notice the existence of this "great divide" [Foucault, 1988]
1
forms of ﬁnancial services. There seems to be a direct correspondence between this moral divide,
associating diﬀerent ﬁnancial institutions with legitimate and illegitimate credit practices, and a
underlying social segmentation of borrowers. On the one hand, banks and their personal loans
department ; on the other hand, a wide set of practices ranging from pay day lenders and tax
refund services to second-mortgage lenders, auto title lenders or, more recently, cash-back plans.
The "fringe" of the supply corresponds to a "marginal" subset of the population: minorities, the
poor, the vulnerable, etc 2.
All of these transactions, whether "fringe" or "mainstream" can be described as unaﬀected
credit, as the loans made are not attached to the purchase of a speciﬁc good or ﬁnancial asset (as
opposed to mortgages loans, car loans, or general installment contracts). Most of these loans are
also unsecured loans, they require no collateral as a security for the money advanced 3, but rather
rely on the future income capacity of borrowers to determine the terms of the contract. These
unsecured loans can either take the form of "personal loans", single loans where the principal
is gradually repaid according to a planned schedule, or open lines of credit, where for a small
monthly fee a limited sum of money is available for an indeﬁnite period of time.
The emergence of a market for unsecured personal loans dominated by commercial banks is the
result of major debates and conﬂicts which took place in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, around
the regulation of what was known at the time as the small loan business. First of all, unsecured
loans to individual consumers remained highly illegitimate until the 1940s, and were only oﬀered
by unregulated credit agencies, labeled at the time as "loan sharks". Secondly, the idea of
providing loans to consumers was completely alien to retail banking up until the 1930s, and only
around the middle of this decade did commercial banks start opening Personal Loan Departments,
as autonomous ﬁnancial organizations within their institutions. The ﬁrst goal of the present
article is to describe the various legitimacy struggles, which took place between 1910 and the mid
1940s, and led to the birth of a regulated market of unaﬀected credit bearing these two features.
Our goal is to understand how particular practices and institutions established themselves as the
gatekeepers of market legitimacy, and to describe the various legal and status-based struggles
which can account for these selection processes. The present research simultaneously argues
that these legitimacy divides, necessary to the creation of a moral market, had major stratifying
2Although research has shown the organizational links between commercial banks and the fringe sector [Fox,
2004], this doesn't challenge the symbolic divide which separate transactions
3Commercial banks oﬀer "secured" loans, usually requiring a car, a house or a savings account as a collateral,
but these loans are for much higher amounts, and are usually not unaﬀected credit : they require a speciﬁc
investment such a major expense or the reﬁnancing a speciﬁc debt.
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eﬀects, and produced a social, racial and geographic segmentation of borrowers, the consequences
of which are, to some extent, still visible today.
1.1 The moral and economic making of markets
Narratives of market legitimization tend to study morals as a set of articulated norms, either
internal to the market and operating through communities [Abolaﬁa, 1996, MacKenzie and
Millo, 2001, Ho, 2009, 2014, Rao et al., 2003] , or external, with reference to a broader cultural
or normative framework [Zelizer, 1983, Fourcade, 2011, Dobbin, 1994, Haveman et al., 2007,
Chan, 2009a,b]. In that perspective, morals are constantly aﬀecting markets : the two are far
from separate, hostile worlds [Zelizer, 2010], and normative considerations are seen as an active
type of market practices. This set of research is, however, primarily interested in accounting for
market creation, or the legitimization of illegal or illegitimate economic practices, and morals
are always kept as an exogenous set of -internal or external, formal or informal- constraints with
which actors comply, or struggle to do so.
An interesting recent trend, introduced by [Fourcade and Healy, 2007], has been to consider
rather the endogenous production of morals within markets, and the authors rightfully state
that markets are explicitely moral projects, saturated with normativity. Put diﬀerently, every
market construction or market operation would imply a form of moral making of the world
[Fassin, 2014], and while we can ﬁnd empirical examples to give support to this claim 4, this has
unfortunately mostly remained at the level of a general and abstract research formulation. As
Quinn [2008] abruptly argues: markets aﬀect morality because there is morality in markets,
and economic sociology should look more into the consequences of this simple but profound
statement. The recent article by Fourcade and Healy [2013] provides an interesting contribution
from that perspective, as it tries to specify one possible channel through which moral eﬀects
of market activities can operate: the production of classiﬁcations about market actors. The
authors study the stratifying eﬀects of consumer credit rating systems, which produce bound-
ary classiﬁcations, including those who have a credit score, and excluding others ; as well as
more continuous classiﬁcations, through the ranking of individuals according to an algorithm
processing their credit history 5. The present article aims at contributing in a similar way to
4MacKenzie and Millo [2001] show for instance that the construction of the market for derivatives changed
both the conception of ﬁnance and the place of economic theory in our society.
5See also Marron [2007] for an analysis of the eﬀect of credit-rating on consumer subjectivity through risk-
evaluation
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studies of morals in markets, by paying attention to the legitimacy eﬀects of the construction of
a market of unsecured consumer loans : these were channeled through the supply side, by the
deﬁnition of legitimate spheres of commerce [Anteby, 2010] ; and through the demand side by
a segmentation of small loan borrowers.
Above all, this is not a standard narrative of market legitimization : both the practices and
the actors involved in the business, in the beginning and in the end of the moral struggles, were
very diﬀerent. Contrary, for instance, to the primary and secondary insurance markets [Zelizer,
1983, Quinn, 2008, Chan, 2009a,b], the market for derivatives [MacKenzie and Millo, 2001], or
the market of funeral services [Trompette and Boissin, 2000], the stake was not, in this case,
to legitimize a particularly unacceptable economic practice  or good - or to frame it in a way
compatible with broader religious or normative systems. Similarly, in the case of unsecured small
loans, moral discourses didn't represent a set of ideologies or conceptions of the world [Ho, 2009,
2014] shared statically by actors in the organizational ﬁeld ; the moral making of the market was
highly conﬂictual, and these disputes produced strong immediate (performative) eﬀects on the
way the unsecured lending business was organized. The above approaches all somehow posit a
degree of separation between moral and economic practices : the symbolic dimension is either an
external constraint, or an internal way of making a contradictory economic reality hold together
[Althusser, 1969, Ho, 2014]. In the case at hand, the moral evaluation of lending transactions -
or contracts - is constantly challenged through normative or legal struggles, and it is impossible
to separate the moral, from the economic making of the activity. Anteby [2010] has suggested
that the moral sociology of markets should focus more on how goods are traded, rather than
what goods are deemed legitimate objects of formal exchange : his study of the commerce in
cadavers in the US shows the eﬀorts of professional gatekeepers of large State chains to separate
their activities from the ones of small private dealers, both by the construction of distinctive
narratives and the deﬁnition of legitimate "practices of trade. This is particularly relevant in
the case of credit, as the variety of money exchanges raises more legitimacy issues than of the
exchange of the commodity itself, as opposed to cases of more marginal goods (such as death,
organs, blood, etc.). This paper aims at mobilizing the insights of approaches usually applied
to marginal, highly symbolic goods, or marginal uses of "normal commodities, such as gifts of
money or local monies [Zelizer, 1989, Blanc, 2000], to better understand some aspects mainstream
economics practices, such as consumer loans.
The ﬁght for the regulation of the business implied multiple operations of selection of accept-
able market practices, in particular regarding the type of collateral, the amount of loans, and the
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terms on which they were made ; all of which occurred through moral conﬂicts between regulated
and unregulated lenders, social reformers and, later, commercial retail banks. These conﬂicts
continuously modiﬁed the content and limits of the market, up until commercial banks took over
and stabilized the market in the 1940s, in the form of "Personal Loans. More speciﬁcally, the
jurisdiction of regulated small loans restricted the legitimacy of transactions to loans of relatively
higher amounts, loans which had to remain exceptional and gradually paid back on installment,
as opposed to smaller , "treasury loans, made as advances on income and which were often
renewed for longer periods of time. These intra market disputes [Abbott, 2014] to deﬁne its
legitimacy boundaries in turn produced stratifying eﬀects, strongly dividing the borrowers on
the basis of their access to the regulated market. In summary, this article therefore aims at
articulating the endogenous moral making of markets, and the stratifying eﬀects of the produced
legal, organizational and technical6 classiﬁcations.
1.2 "Loan sharks" and the legitimacy of unsecured consumer lending
The stigma against money lending is probably one of the oldest moral restraint, and studying
it as a piece of "ﬁrst order moral, or cultural phenomenon [Abend, 2014] doesn't provide much
original results (see "Loan Shark" box). The ﬁght against early 20th century loan sharks is
insightful provided that one takes into account the precise economic and organizational practices
carried by both regulated and unregulated lenders, and considers this critique as a discursive
cue, indicative of deeper and more intricate interactions of morals and markets. Indeed, the
phrase "loan shark" can be analyzed as a form of "labelling", continuously used to describe
illegitimate, generally illegal lenders or practices, keeping in mind that while the idiom itself
remained intact until today 7, the realities the term tries to categorize, as deviant or immoral,
massively varied across historical periods. In the late 19th century, the ﬁgure of the "loan shark"
emerged as a modern embodiment of usury in an industrial society. The phrase was, at ﬁrst,
meant to describe all transactions involving unaﬀected loans of money made by unregulated
lenders : it was commonly used by social reformers, implicitly deﬁning, until the 1940s, what
good business practices legitimate small loans lenders were supposed to adopt. The story of
the campaign against loan sharks, carried in particular by the Russell Sage Foundation and its
6We will pay attention to the type of collateral asked, as well as the method to report the costs and charges
of loans.
7See for instance the widespread references to "loan sharks" in the microﬁnance industry,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/opinion/15yunus.html
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organized movements of local intermediaries, has been widely documented in the recent years.
Unfortunately, however, most of these accounts remain very cultural or institutional, and pay
little attention neither to the actual market or organizational practices, nor to the detailed
history of the legal struggles involving small loan transactions Calder [2009], Marron [2009],
Hyman [2011], Trumbull [2012, 2014]. The few detailed empirical analyses, on the contrary, tend
to focus excusively on the passage of the Uniform Small Loan Laws, with no regards for their
actual implementation, or the larger debates in economic moralities [Anderson, 2008, Carruthers
et al., 2012].
Krippner [2002] suggests that, rather than positing the existence of a invariant market, eco-
nomic sociology should study the actual practices of actors involved in the design of a speciﬁc
economic activity, without making any a priori assumptions about the scope of economic ex-
changes which can be regrouped as a "market, or a "business. Personal loans, as a formal
business, didn't exist in the beginning of the 20th century, not only because of moral restric-
tions, but also because of legal, economic and organizational factors. An unregulated business
was already well established by the 1900s, providing small loans of unaﬀected money to urban
consumers, and in the 1910s these lenders, described as "loan sharks, started to be massively
criticized by social reformers regarding their unsound commercial practices : sky-high interest
rates, violent debt collection methods and a general disrespectability became a public common-
place critique of small loans. Social reformers, soon joined by a fraction of unregulated lenders,
fought for a legal reform of the small loan business, which established legal exceptions to States
usury caps for loans of amounts lower than $300 [Clark et al., 1930, Robinson and Nugent,
1935, Michelman, 1970]. These very general dispositions, along with various clauses insuring
respectability of money loans made to individual consumers, were drafted in a series of bills,
the Uniform Small Loan Laws, which were successfully passed in many States between 1917 and
1921 [Carruthers et al., 2012].
We argue that, even though social reformers had precise ideas about the general moralization
of the market, the initial legal reforms paid little attention to the actual transactions carried,
their variety, as well as the general purpose of this new form of credit. The separation between
legitimate and illegitimate unaﬀected consumer lending involved a "qualiﬁcation of a particular
set of economics transactions, and moral categories were established to evaluate the social "worth
of this new type of business. One speciﬁc question arose, which polarized the debate until the
take-over by retail commercial banks, and concerned the type of collateral required to apply for
regulated lending. In particular, could small loans be justiﬁed as unsecured loans, based only
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on the workers' future wages, or, put diﬀerently, was the future capacity of consumers to repay
a legitimate basis to insure the worth of the market ? These moral conﬂicts, over the valuation
of credit collateral, were more than purely technical or legal debates: they crystallized general
interrogations about the role of credit in an industrial, wage-earning, society, and the conditions
under which loans of money could actually enhance the "welfare of American consumers. Indeed,
social reformers and regulated lenders always opposed structural forms of indebtedness for the
working class: legitimate loans had to remain exceptional, and budgeted around carefully thought
repayment plans. In particular, the principal had to be repaid in a ﬁnite number of installments,
with a ﬁxed overall interest rate of the remaining balance. On the contrary, up until the 1930s,
unsecured loans based on notes or wage assignment contracts, were very small loans, renewed
indeﬁnitely at each pay day : they were "treasury loans, made to consolidate existing debt,
payback bills or face daily household expenses. Hence, they would usually run for a long time
and a discount fee was charged at each new renewal, not unlike modern credit-lines. The latter
features made this type of lending unacceptable, both regarding its business ethics model[Abend,
2014] and the eﬀect it would have on borrowers' welfare, and this led regulated lenders to focus
exclusively on chattel mortgages, loans of higher amounts based on a lien on the borrowers
property. Only when commercial banks took over the business in the mid 1930s were they able,
through status distinction, to establish a legitimate form of unsecured lending, while at the same
time producing a strong "boundary classiﬁcation between legitimate and illegitimate small loan
borrowers.
Hence, this is not purely a "strategic view of market legitimacy" [Anteby, 2010] : contrary, for
instance, to the clear distinction strategies of "nouvelle cuisine" French chefs [Rao et al., 2003],
this article wishes to contribute to a "practice-based view of moral markets" [Anteby, 2010],
without positing institutional change in a market as an a priori necessary outcome. These
struggles were carried at the local  municipal or State -level, principally through legal battles,
supported by massive public scandalization tactics [De Blic and Lemieux, 2005] ; which, along
with detailed empirical accounts of credit companies' commercial and organizational practices,
constitute the basis of this study. As [Fourcade and Healy, 2007] put it, a "focus on conﬂict over
meaning[,] opens the prospect of linking local battles over particular transactions with large-scale
shifts in categories of worth.
In the second section, we will see that at the beginning of the 20th century, "loan sharks, or
unregulated lenders of unaﬀected money, were providing a wide array of loans : the range of loan
amounts, the type of collateral required, and the populations resorting to their services, were
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all very diverse. Nevertheless, we can already identify, within these loans, a legitimacy divide,
both in the practices of lending companies and the public perception of the business. Indeed,
the business was segmented, sometimes within individual agencies, between very small loans,
ranging from $1 to $20, or $50, lent as money advances on the next payday, and larger loans
(between 50 and $400, although these separations are ﬂuctuating), usually linked to a lien of the
borrower's property, a contract known as a chattel mortgage. The passage, in various States,
of the Uniform Small Loan Laws in the late 1910s was an important step in the construction
of a legitimate business of small loans to consumers, yet we will analyze in a third section the
indeterminacy which followed the legislative reform, and the ongoing struggles linked with legal
enforcement and legal solidiﬁcation [Pedriana and Stryker, 2004, Edelman et al., 2011]. The
smaller, unsecured loans, raised many legal and moral debates, and the "loan shark came to
represent in the 1920s the ﬁgure of the "payday usurer, known as the "salary buyer at the
time.
These debates emphasized quite opposite visions of consumer lending, as we said earlier,
and in the 1920s through the late 1930s, the market was therefore strictly separated between
regulated credit companies, specialized in secured chattel mortgages, and unregulated "salary
buyers dealing in smaller, unsecured loans. The regulated business was thought as a service for
the growing class of working men and women, yet it was their quality of property owners, and
not solely their status of wage earner, which guaranteed access to regulated loans : collateral was
the sign of a social earmarking of credit [Zelizer, 1989]. Such a partition implied a strong social
segmentation of borrowers, between the chattel owners who could comply with the collateral
requirements and aﬀord higher loans, and the rest of the working class, and this segmentation
translated along strong racial and geographical lines, which will be documented from various
sources.
In the last section, we will analyze how the stratifying eﬀects of market creation became
even more visible as commercial banks gradually took over the small loan business, from the
mid 1930s until the 1940s. After the ﬁnancial crisis of 1929, commercial banks were looking to
re-establish their place in the nation's economy, and saw in the ﬁeld of personal loans, as bankers
were referring to it, a way to both make proﬁt and rebuild links with the "community. Very
much at odds with what had been done by regulated lenders up until then, banks very early
adopted a model of unsecured loan contract: "personal loans were described as salary loans,
made to wage earners, and based solely on their future income capacity to repay. Part of the
reason lies in the post-crisis regulation set up by the FHA, which triggered commercial banks'
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interest in making unsecured lending to individual consumers [Hyman, 2011, Trumbull, 2014],
yet, this legal explanation was only one aspect of the story. Bankers truly believed that a proper
supply of unaﬀected money to American consumers could not be tied to property ownership.
Commercial banks were able to, through their higher institutional and economic status, take
over the business of regulated small loans, and impose a legitimate unsecured form of personal
loans. Simultaneously, the PLDs of banks sharpened the earlier segmentation of borrowers,
arguing that legitimate personal loans could only be made to the "cream of the community",
the growing middle class. The legitimacy divides in the market for unaﬀected loans, which had
been until the mid 1930s an unexpected consequence of law implementation, became a conscious
market eﬀort from banks to establish themselves banks as legitimate providers of legitimate
personal loans . The earmarking of consumer credit drifted from an indirect social segmentation
in the 1920s, operating through security requirements, to a direct social selection of borrowers,
relegating to the "fringe" most of the early borrowers who relied on small, unaﬀected loans of
money.
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The "loan shark ﬁgurea :
References to "money sharks, or "land sharks are very common in the 19th century, and they embody
very speciﬁc ﬁgures. The former is closely attached to the Wall Street ﬁnancial community, and above
all bankers, who were seen as controlling the liquidities, the supply of which had been one of the major
societal issues from the 1860s onwards [Carruthers and Babb, 1996, Babb, 1996] ; whereas the latter
referred to land estate intermediaries who made a proﬁt out of overpricing bad lots to pioneers settling on
the Frontier, and took advantage of their fragility. The expression "loan shark" started appearing at the
end of the 19th century, and signaled a shift in the cultural conﬂicts about uses of money [Zelizer, 1989],
although the general idea of exploitative monetary transactions taking advantage of dominated clients
was still very present. The early 20th century usurer represented speciﬁcally the lender of unaﬀected
credit who made a business of providing small loans to workers in poor urban environments. It was
very much attached to a representation of anomy and the loss of traditional social links, in particular
credit links, due to processes or urbanization, and stabilization of a wage earning society. Workers in
big cities were seen as having no social ties as well as very little property, and having to resort to "loan
sharks as a way to make ends meet until payday arrived. This criticism was very speciﬁc, all merchants
practicing money lending were not accused of being "loan sharks. In particular, neither pawn brokers,
who required that the pawned-property was moved to the loan oﬃce, nor retail merchants who practices
open account credit, were even accused of doing immoral or illegitimate money advances on a general
level. The expression was targeting loan companies who relied, in case of default, on garnishment
procedures, whether levying on the workingman or woman's property, or assigning his or her wages
directly from the employer. This was closely linked to a rhetoric revolving around the ﬁgure of the
"breadwinner : those usurious industrial loans were preventing American households, and especially
male wage-earners, to support themselves and their families, precisely because they drew liens on their
goods, or their "living wage [Glickman, 1999]. Interestingly, this imagery bore no implicit religious or
ethic underpinnings: no traces have been found of actual references to Jewish communities, even where
explicit mentions of Shylocks, the Merchant of Venice, or rapacious money lenders are very common.
This shows that the "loan shark was a very historically situated ﬁgure, linked to the particular liquidity
issues raised by the trajectories of workers in the industrial society of the turn of the century.
aThe following elements are summarized from a systematic analysis of press articles mentioning the phrase
"loan shark", or associated idioms such as "loansharking", "loansharkery", "money shark" and "land shark",
from 1880 until 1945. The three databases used are online newspaper archives. We have chosen the "Chronicling
America" series of the Library of Congress, which compiled a representative sample of 100 000 newspaper pages
per State, until the year 1922 (http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/about/). For a national newspaper counterpart
for later years, we have chosen to read the New York Times archives. Finally, as this article focuses on local
crusades carried in Atlanta, Georgia, we have chosen to analyze more precisely various Georgia newspapers, such
as the Atlanta Journal and Constitution (the records were covered on site at the Atlanta Fulton Public Library),
the Atlanta Georgian, and local publications of other major cities, Savannah, Macon and Athens. For a full
description of the newspapers digitalized, see http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/MediaTypes/Newspapers.html10
2 Who were the loan sharks ? 1900-1920
We have shown that the expression "loan sharks" came to represent a very speciﬁc type of lender,
those specializing in unaﬀected loans of money, but what type of credit were they selling and
what population were they servicing ?
2.1 Diﬀerent Loan "pools" show a social earmarking of unaﬀected
credit
Loan distribution and loan "pools" Unregulated credit agencies were operated as chain-
agencies: with headquarters located in a major city, they established branches of similar sizes,
often way across State lines. The initial agencies were build out of family capital, or personal
funds earned by the owner at some other trade 8, and when business was supposed to be extended,
the standard practice was to allocate $1000 as funds to lend in a delocalized branch. Agencies
were organized along a patterned structure, employing a manager, an assistant, often one or two
clerks and debt collection agents. Various elements show that there was a lot of mobility and
turnover within, and across agencies : an employee who started as an outside collection agent
could easily move up the hierarchy as new agencies were opened. The two larger chains, which
will we document extensively in this article, appeared to be very centralized : operations of
accounting, auditing, or advertising decisions had to be made by the main oﬃces, and branch
agencies were mostly focusing on turning the capital into "active accounts" 9.
Regarding the loan practices themselves, we have managed to gather a representative set of
data from one of the major unregulated small loan company 10. In 1917, the major Northern,
Chicago-based, chain of loan sharks was operating over the entire North East and Midwest
areas, and was known as the "Mackey Syndicate" 11. When the 1917 Uniform Small Loan
Law was discussed in Illinois, this major "loan shark" company provided social reformers with
data taken from an internal study of its customers: the aim of this was to inform the ongoing
regulation process, and simultaneously for the former "sharks" to secure an incumbent position
8The larger chains' leader started as either merchant, lawyers, or bankers.
9A large set of internal correspondence between a branch auditor and managers of a main oﬃce in Atlanta
shows this internal allocation of tasks. These documents were seized in an investigation of the loan shark business
in Covington, Kentucky, in 1932, and are kept in RSF, Box 124, Folder PE Leake and JH Taylor Correspondence
10A section of the data was printed in Hodson [1919], pp 5976, see
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101056350281;view=1up;seq=63
11"Memorandum on HFC, Financial History", HSCB Archives
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for their company in the future regulated business 12. Six samples of approximately one hundred
customers each, drawn from six various locations in Illinois were taken as a base for the study :
each borrower was asked to report the amount of money borrowed, the length of the loan, her or
his occupation, and the reason for borrowing the money. The ﬁrst important result is the wide
range of loans oﬀered to borrowers : amounts vary from $5 to $400, and loans run from 2 to 12
months. The ﬁrst graph of Figure 1 (solid line) represents the distribution of loans according to
the level of the principal, and provides interesting insights into the actual loan practices of the
company.
First, we can notice that the distribution bears several modes, deﬁning what seems to be
diﬀerent loan "pools". A ﬁrst set of loans seem to range from 10 to 50 dollars, and those
represent the large majority of loans (391). We can identify two proﬁles of agencies, regarding
the way they handled these very small loans : half the branches display a bimodal distribution
within the 10-50 $ range, with high frequencies around 10-15 $ and 20-25$ whereas the other
half had higher average level of loans below $50, with high frequencies around 20-25 $ and at $
50. This element suggests more complexities within this lower "pool" of loans.
A second mode of the overall distribution appears around $ 100 and a third one around $200,
however, only 45 loans have been made for amounts strictly higher than $100. These represent
only 7.6 % of the total number of loans made - although they represent 25% of the total money
loaned by these credit agencies. 13
A hierarchy between small loans This distribution suggests that within the wide range of
loans, there were diﬀerences as to the type of loans and services oﬀered by "loan sharks", and
indeed very small loans, those under $50 or under $20, always seem to have a speciﬁc status.
Smaller loans are indeed mostly made to industry workers, with a majority of railroad men, steel
factory employees or day laborers. As for the "reason for borrowing", the smaller loans most
often indicate an advance on salaries, a need to consolidate existing debt, or to settle existing
bills, in particular medical debt. On the contrary, on average, higher loans are on the opposite
made to higher socio-occupational status :engineers and physicians all borrow more than $150,
12Hodson [1919], p 59.
13Another striking feature is the fairly standardized terms on which loans were made. Similar levels of principal
determined similar repayment schedules, and even if unfortunately the data doesn't report interest rates, we can
assume that the cost of loans was also standardized across locations and agencies. Similar principals determine
similar repayment periods, although plotting this relation shows a strong concavity in the curve : as loans get
higher, the average length per dollar loaned diminishes very strongly. Thus, a $5 loan requires a two months
repayment period, as another $400 was scheduled to be repaid within 12 months.
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Figure 1: Distribution of loan by principal, 1917-1936.
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and so do managers or shop owners, and these populations state a direct and clear expense as
a justiﬁcation for the loan. However, these were average trends, and counter examples may be
found: a bell boy who borrowed 200 to buy a store and start a business whereas on the contrary
one physician borrowed $50 from the shark "on account of poor collection" from his patients.
The data suggests that the hierarchy of loan types matched a particular social distribution of
clients: even if a single agency could make loans both to street musicians , industry workers, and
State engineers, the type of personal loans they would be oﬀered was socially earmarked.
Indeed, the hierarchy of small loans is associated at the time with diﬀerent status perception.
In 1917, a representative of the Maryland Association of Small Loan Brokers, lamented that, in
the city of Baltimore, the "$10 loan specialists" rarely "care much for adding tone or standard
to the business" (of small loans). These loans are oﬀered by "neighborhood oﬃces", "not in date
and out of tune with the times", they "keep open until late Saturday nights", they "double-up"
on loans, they advertise through "cheap and trashy door to door distribution" ; in short, the
are "devoid of any business sense or standards whatsoever". More importantly, these "smaller
type of loan oﬃces" and their practices, are "conducive to increased borrowing by a class of
people who do not reckon it is amiss to carry two or more loans at the same time". This speaker
clearly makes a connection between a type of illegitimate supply, which is deﬁned by a lower
(both morally and in dollars) type of loan, and a speciﬁc "class" of the population which doesn't
seem to behave as sound borrowers should 14. The author seems to suggest that these concerns
primarily trade with the "colored population" of Baltimore, which at the time represent only
1/8 of the city population, and do not have access to the "larger", more proper, "down town
concerns" [Phillips, 1997].
The data on Illinois do not contain information on the collateral asked for the loans, neither
do they indicate the racial distribution of borrowers, so they do not enable us to verify the
existence of a separation such as in Baltimore. However, data collected on a second large chain
of agencies based in Atlanta seem to conﬁrm these results.
2.2 Secured chattel loans and unsecured payday plans : a social and
racial segmentation
A good example of this internal hierarchy of loans is given by JE Goodwin, loan shark employee,
who worked all over the South for more than a decade as a debt collector. In 1925, he decided
14AASLB Annual Report, 1917 p 48.
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to abandon the "loan shark" business and and work for the Russell Sage Foundation, ﬁghting
against his former employers. His testimony shows that loan agencies would carry both types
of loans, larger chattel mortgages and "small pay day" plans, but these were targeting diﬀerent
populations. The former were usually contracted in a main oﬃce, whereas "payday" were usually
established as branches, close to a particular factory or industrial shop, and payment would be
collected directly at the shops every week. The following example illustrates the functioning
of the "payday" plan, at a time when Goodwin was working in Birgmingham AL, the foundry
capital of the US:
"I began searching for a good shop to open a small pay day and ﬁnally decided to start loaning
negroes at Stockham Pipe and Fitting Co 15. At that time being about one thousand negroes
were employed there. My ﬁrst trip there was Saturday in march 1919. I began lending money
this way, $5 and $10 loans taking a straight note and charging $1.85 for two weeks, and for $10
I charged $2.50 for two weeks. I worked this place better than three years without missing one
Saturday. After the ﬁrst sixty days I began turning in $500 each Saturday to the oﬃce. Later on
I went as high as $80 a week proﬁt at this one place. [...] I had very few customers who borrowed
as high as $20. The average loan was $10. All of my customers knew me and they would walk
by and pay their interest and say they would see me later."16
Agencies were organized at the neighborhood level, so as to keep diﬀerent "clientèle" separate,
something which had important organizational advantages for the lenders. In a city like Atlanta,
transportation was tedious for African Americans, and racial relations were very tense 17, and
it seems that white borrowers usually went to the downtown agencies, while collectors would
directly go to the neighborhoods or the shops to collect money from coloured workers. In the
state of Georgia in 1903, a Grand Jury investigation on the "Loan Shark problem" found that
their clients were 40% white and 60% black 18, and it seems that there was a strict segmentation
of agencies by racial proﬁles. An account book belonging to a neighborhood manager in Atlanta
shows this agency separation 19. James Murphy Hill was a white small manager and collector
based in Darktown, Atlanta, and his records for the year 1910-1911 show a huge majority of
African Americans, with loans of very small amounts - between 50c and $5. The addresses
indicated in the book conﬁrm that collectors were operating along standard "routes", which
15The world's largest valve and ﬁtting company for more than 60 years, the second largest employer of the city,
after Sloss Furnaces.
16JE Goodwin, Statement to Atlanta Legal Aid Society, march 8 1927. RSF, Box 16.
17The apex of these tensions came with the Atlanta race riots of 1906, see Bauerlein [2001].
18Report of Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury, to the Judge of superior court of Fulton County, 1903
19James Murphy Hill Account Book Records, 1910-11. Georgia State Archives
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they followed each week, usually on a bicycle 20. These collector were common ﬁgure of working
class neighborhood lives, as one account mentions the weekly ritual of children running about the
"wheel", yelling "here comes the loan man !" 21, as he was proceeding with payment collection,
. Interestingly, there is quite a strong majority of women present in the accounts, most of them
working in domestic services, especially as washerwomen and roomers or managers of boarding
houses. Hunter [1997] has documented the lives of black women workers in Atlanta in the ﬁrst
decades of the 20th century, and she shows that some of them, especially washerwomen, had a
strong monopoly on their trade, which made them good potential clients for small loan creditors.
James Vaughan, a former attorney for the lenders, testiﬁed in 1926 before a notary public :
"The washerwoman comes in Friday or Saturday. She has delivered the clothes to the owner
and received her pay for the work she has done. She borrows ﬁve dollars from the loan shark
and sign her name on a blank assignment, and agrees to pay for the use of this ﬁve dollars,
$1.60 per month. [...] He has conﬁdence in this poor old colored women's honesty to pay her
debts, therefore he cares not whether the transaction is legal or illegal" 22. In Macon GA, an
association of washerwomen signed a petition and sent it to the city commissioner in 1916 to ask
protection from the loan sharks, as the author states: "they claim that white people do not pay
them enough and that they are forced to borrow money to make both ends meet, and after doing
so they are continually harassed by the collectors, who, they claim, enter their homes and abuse
them when they are unable to pay right on the dot23. While it is hard to have a clear view
of the gender distribution of borrowers, according to the head of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society,
small payday loans in Georgia were made "chieﬂy to negro women" 24. Ida Benjamin, an African
American nurse testiﬁes in front of the 1903 Fulton Cy Grand Jury on the huge amount of debt
she has contracted from multiple money lenders 25. The loans were made in her name because
her husband, employed as a dyer, had a very irregular income, whereas her nursing job was
much more stable. She started with a $5 from the RD King Co., but as other bills were piling
up, "it looked to me like trouble began opening up in that home of ours like cotton bolls in a
warm September sunshine". Over the course of 18 months she has borrowed amounts of 4 and 5
20See also Leslie C. Harbison's biography, (HFC Records, HSCB Archives ), as the later CEO of the Household
Finance Corporation also started as a debt collector in a neighborhood of Philadelphia.
21The Truth about Loan Sharks, by James L. Vaughan, RSF, box 123 RD King Folder.
22James L. Vaughan Statement about "Loan Sharks" in Fulton County, given before NP. RSF, box 16, JLR
Boyd Folder
23"Washerwomen's League asks City's protection from many collectors", AJC archives, September 23 1916.
24Substitutes for Loan Sharks in Atlanta, JLR Boyd. RSF box 15.
25"Told story of interest : it ate up all of her wages", AJC archives, November 9 1903.
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dollars from eight diﬀerent lenders, at ﬁrst she thought she was going to pay back the principal
with interests, but as payments "seemed to be coming a little faster than paydays where coming
slow", she ended up with "a basket full of papers", trying only to keep up with interest charges
26. This over representation of women borrowers in African American communities is a well
know feature of consumer credit, and it is to some extent still the case today, as Desmond [2012]
recently noticed in his study of inner city Milwaukee.
It is impossible to know if this racial segmentation of agencies perfectly matched a specializa-
tion of agencies regarding their dominant type of loan and collateral asked, but diﬀerent empirical
elements seem to point in that direction. Conﬁrming the comments mentioned earlier by the Bal-
timore observer, in 1926, Frank Wood, Commissioner of Labor in the State of Louisiana stresses
that in the city of New Orleans, "so far as the railroads are concerned, most of the victims of
these sharks are negroes. However, I was in one of the places Saturday, I saw six persons go to
one of the cage windows and ﬁll out these salesslips and receive money. These men were white,
they looked more like clerks than laborers. With one exception, they seemed to be minors, or at
the most, not over 21 or 22 years old"27. So, while "it appears" that "these operators are doing
everybody they can", there seems to be a strong racial and social segmentation between what the
Baltimore observer called the "unsound" neighborhood agencies specializing in "payday" type
loans which proceed by door-to-door collection and the more respectable "downtown concerns"
were people make their payments directly in the oﬃce.
As we can see, in cases of unsecured lending, the money was not loaned on installment: the
initial transaction, a money advance, was very often renewed period after period, with a partial
repayment and a small fee attached to this renewal ; which also meant that one day the principal
was supposed to be repaid in full. These loans were not made on tangible property but on the
future capacity of the borrower to repay, and often required wage assignment contracts as a
guarantee for the money borrowed. As companies grew in size and stability, lenders could, in
cases of default, more easily collect interests and the principal directly on the worker's wages.
The assignment note would be signed oﬀ when the initial loan was made, and in case of default28
a letter would be sent to the employer, or the employee's superintendent, to garnish the workers
earned wages. These cases were usually settled in very low courts and handled, up until the
26op. cit.
27New Orleans Times-Picayune, November 1926
28This was usually a last resort for lenders, who most of the time would try to keep account active, even if some
payments were skipped.
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Figure 2: Formal wage assignment contract, 1910 Georgia Archives, James Murphy Hill Business
Papers.
1920s at least, by Justices of the Peace 29. Wage assignment contracts can be found as early as
1884, but they grew in size and became more formal as large industrial organizations developed
[Easterly, 2009]. Late 19th century records of Sloss Furnaces in Birmingham AL contain 30, to
our knowledge, some of the older hand-written wage assignments notes, signed on loose paper
slips. Similar, more formal contracts - typed, and bearing standardized legal clauses - were
commonly found in the records of a JP court in Fulton County GA, in 1906, to garnish wages of
local railroad employees 31. These contracts, were not necessarily based upon well deﬁned civil
statutes, but it seems that the formal legal appearance of the contract was often suﬃcient, both
for courts and borrowers, to press for prompt and complete payments. We have included one
example in ﬁgure 2 As payments were collected, and the transaction renewed every payday, the
computation of interest was not straightforward and these could appear as sales of wages.
We have emphasized the wide variety of loans made by unregulated lenders, ﬁrst regarding the
terms of the transactions and the type of borrowers they were servicing. The data shows that
these were not a continuum of homogeneous interactions: all agencies seemed to diﬀerentiate
between two types of loans, a hierarchy very often translated in moral or symbolic terms by
contemporary observers. Beyond the apparent homogeneity of the "loan shark" ﬁgure therefore
29AHC, MSS 809 Justice of The Peace Records, JG Bloodworth 1905-1908
30Sloss Furnaces Records, Birgmingham Public Library Archives, Folder Wage Assignments.
31AHC, MSS 809, op. cit.
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lied major diﬀerences in the actual business these lenders were carrying : the line separating
secured from unsecured loans was to some extent already operating, and implied a distribution
of clients along class and racial lines. We have identiﬁed this divide through an analysis of the
practices of unregulated small loan companies, but until the late 1910s it had no legal existence,
and neither did it separate between a legitimate and an illegitimate market: all unregulated
forms of unaﬀected credit were similarly targeted as questionable forms of money-lending.
3 The legitimization of the secured small loan business, from
1920 to the mid 1930s
The critique against unregulated "loan shark" lenders grew as a larger, more organized ﬁght in
the second half of the 1910s, and it lasted until commercial banks took over the business in the
late 1930s. These crusades aimed at legal reforms which were supposed to regulate small loan
transactions and build a legitimate market of unaﬀected consumer lending 32. The following
section will analyze the enforcement of the Small Loan Laws33, passed in the late 1910s, and
the particular struggle against illegitimate "salary buyers", which led to a segmentation of the
market in the 1920s.
3.1 Heterogeneous credit practices in face of legal uniformity : law
enforcement and the market
The Uniform Small Loan Laws The impetus for legal reform came from a philanthropic
institution, the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF), which, in 1905, set up a Department of Remedial
Loans, as a solution to the "loan shark evil" [Robinson and Nugent, 1935]. This was seen as one
of the most crucial problem faced by the working class and growing middle class in that period
34. The activities of this institution have been well documented in recent research [Calder, 2009,
Marron, 2009, Hyman, 2011, Carruthers et al., 2012], their main strategy consisted in staging
32"Anti loan shark crusades" have been waged since 1887, but the ﬁght against unsecured lending became a
standard feature of the campaigns after 1920. An exhaustive list of all the 305 local "anti loan shark crusades"
carried before 1923 is available in RSF, Box 121, Folder "Loan shark campaigns before 1923". This list detailed
the actors involved, the diﬃculties faced and the achievements for each crusade, and the account given here wishes
to represent the most common traits of these campaigns.
33Recent, neo-institutionalist developments in the sociology of Law have emphasized the importance of law
enforcement processes in institutional changes within organizational ﬁelds [Edelman et al., 2011]
34Arthur Ham,The campaign against the loan shark, Division of Remedial Loans, RSF 1912
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local ﬁghts, usually at the city level, and try to raise public attention regarding immoral or
illegal credit practices. The solution put forward by the Foundation was to authorize higher
usury rates for loans of small amounts, which were deﬁned as loans under 300$. This exception
in commercial law would, according to its supporters, enable licensed lenders to oﬀer legal loans
to "poor borrowers" and working men, while still making a proﬁt. This market solution was
intended to drive illegal loan sharks out of business by establishing a "scientiﬁc" interest rate,
and the choice of this usury "cap" occupied much of the regulation discussions. Anderson [2008]
showed that reformers eventually settled on a monthly legal rate of 3.5%, or 42% yearly 35, which
was seen as a "scientiﬁc" compromise between business interests and philanthropic considerations
: it would allow credit companies to make some proﬁts, despite the high credit risk of small loan
borrowers, yet those would be limited, as compared to loans made by unregulated lenders. This
was carried at the State level, as State legislatures were in charge of usury laws and rates: in
1917, the Foundation drafted a model bill, the Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL), which was to
intended be passed in every State legislature and establish a well regulated small loan business
country-wide [Michelman, 1970, Carruthers et al., 2012] 36
Despite the highly symbolic aspect of the loan shark crusades, publically staged as a ﬁght
of "good" credit against "evil" sharks, the Foundation also paid close attention to the actual
implementation of the Law. 37 Indeed, the aim was to actually regulate the business, which meant
establishing functioning credit agencies, obtaining judgement of usury against illegal practices in
courts, setting up business associations to uphold good business ethics, etc.: the passing of a law
was only one step in the process 38. The determinants of the passage of the USLL have been well
analyzed by Carruthers et al. [2012], however, much still needed to be done after the Law had
been passed to eﬀectively implement the regulation, and these consequences of law enforcement
have not been studied yet. Pedriana and Stryker [2004] oﬀer an analysis of such law enforcement
35This was much higher than former State usury Laws, which varied from 6% to 10% annually interests between
legislatures.
36In Illinois, this was done with the help and support of local "loan sharks", as mentioned earlier, and the
1917 model Bill was drafted by Frank Hubachek, Frank Mackey's leading attorney. See Yearbook of American
Association of Small Loan Brokers, p. 37, June 1917.
37And this contrary, for instance, to the Temperance movements studied by Joseph Gusﬁeld [1986] on the same
period, which were mostly concerned with status recognition.
38The expression "passage and enforcement of the Law" is very commonly found in the Foundation's archives,
an indicator of the general set of mind which regarded legal reform as a means for regulation, rather than an
end in itself, such as in Gusﬁeld's case. See for instance Letter Harbison to Rutherford, October 20 1922, RSF
archives Rockerfeller Foundation.
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processes in the case of federal anti-discrimination labor regulation : they show that in the case
of Title VII, social movements played a central role in the implementation of loosely worded text,
and hence participated actively in the deﬁnition of anti-discrimination policies in the workplace.
The case at hand a priori seems to be completely alien to this framework : small loan laws
were State laws, and not "broad" federal "statutory constructions" [Pedriana and Stryker, 2004]
; and they deﬁned clear commercial clauses, in particular the legal rate of 42%, which simply
implied calculations on the level of principal and the number of installments paid. However,
this exclusive focus on business ethics and a ﬁxed interest rate created a homogeneous legal
framework for all loans under 300$, whereas as we have already seen, these loans were of very
diﬀerent forms regarding the amounts loaned, the reason for borrowing, the collateral asked and
the borrowers' proﬁles. Because of "transparency" 39 reasons, social reformers always rejected
the idea of a scaled legislation, which would have implied variable interest rates depending on the
level of principal and the type of security available to the borrower. The underlying heterogeneity
of small loans was contradictory with the abstract "uniform" legal and moral status, and this
spurred major diﬃculties in the application of the law, speciﬁcally when dealing with smaller,
unsecured forms of lending.
Later on, in the 1930s, regulated small loan lenders were commonly referred to as "regulated
chattel lenders", and various data show that they were oﬀering almost exclusively secured loans
(see section 3.5), based on possessed property, and loans for amounts above $100 or $150, de-
pending on the company. This evolution was not a direct consequence of the legal reforms - the
small loan bills passed in various States did not impose such a restriction - and neither was it
seen in the 1910s as a necessary feature of the regulated market under construction 40. It was the
enforcement of the USLL in the 1920s which produced a segmentation of small loans, between on
the one hand smaller, unsecured transactions, based solely on the worker's future income capac-
ity, and higher secured loans, based on the property owned by borrowers. And this regulation
did not only result in a restriction as to the type of collateral necessary to make a moral market,
it more generally deﬁned a set of legitimate business practices for small loan companies, which
in turn had a deep and lasting impact on the segmentation of borrowers. The following section
will study the enforcement of the USLL, showing ﬁrst the legitimacy struggles which produced
a segmentation of market practices, and then the consequences this specialization had on the
39See Anderson [2008] for an analysis of this notion in the Foundation's discourse.
40We found no references to the legitimacy of collateral types in the pre-USLL debates among social reformers,
neither in the general or professional press, nor in the conferences held by the NFRLA or the AASLB.
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segmentation of borrowers.
3.2 The ﬁght against "salary buyers", legitimate collateral and legiti-
mate borrowers.
As an illustration of the consequences of this regulation, the second graph of Figure 1 plots the
distribution of loans from a series of 12 agencies belonging to HFC in the State of Wisconsin
for the year 1936 41. We have plotted the same graph as before, for the 6 Illinois agencies in
1917, in order show a major shift to the right of the distribution 42. The average loan made
in 1936 amounted to 184$ and lasted for 8.4 months. Additionally, an internal study carried
by HFC on its Illinois oﬃces in 1934 shows that the average loan was made for $190, and $138
for the lower income bracket43. Although the ﬁgures "for unlicensed lenders are based upon
exceedingly sparse data", Robinson and Nugent [1935] also noted this evolution : according to
their estimates, the average size of loans made by unregulated lenders has decreased from $40
to $25 whereas the average for licensed lenders has increased from $55 to $ 130 between 1915
and 1932 44, so this shift doesn't seem to be speciﬁc to HFC. As the regulation came about in
the 1910s and 1920s, regulated lenders specialized in relatively higher loans, along with longer
repayment periods. Moreover, this average loan size doesn't seem change to change as we move
into the 1930s : a statistical report made by the RSF on licensed small loan lenders in Illinois,
shows that the average loan made stopped increasing on the period 1928-1941 45, suggesting that
the early consequences of regulation were at the origin of this evolution.
More than a change in average, there always seems to be a lower bound to the loans made by
regulated credit agencies, and, even if its level varies across states and companies, it is always
present as a sort of counterpart to the legal upper bound of $300. In an oﬃcial publication from
HFC to a local newspaper, explaining their business practices, the corporation states "We do
not make loans of less than $100": according to them, "loans in sums of $100 to $300" seems to
be "suﬃcient to employ all [their] capital", hence the decision to limit restrict their business to
41Data were collected from a survey of 10 554 Wisconsin accounts from HFC clients, RSF box 83, box HFC
Analysis of accounts.
42These are stated in 1917 dollars. The cumulated inﬂation rate on the 1917-1936 period, calculated from data
reported monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is 8.6%. Hence plotting the distribution in nominal terms
doesn't aﬀect much the relative distribution between the two dates.
43RSF, box 84, folder HFC Analysis of size loans
44Robinson and Nugent [1935], p. 175
45RSF, box 57 Folder Illinois Statistics.
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the "highest class of loans" 46 . Louis Robinson, the consumer ﬁnance department head of the
Foundation states, in 1929, that loans made "were formerly much smaller" before the passing
of the USLL, which is veriﬁed in the case of HFC. In 1936, a report published by the Kansas
Legislative Council emphasizes that "very few concerns, outside of those speciﬁcally in the loan
shark class, make many loans under 50$ if they can avoid it". Some regulated lenders would
occasionally provide this type of service, "primarily for accommodation purposes with a view
in part to good will and advertising", but these practices had to remain marginal in order for
the legitimate lenders not to be associated with the category of "loan sharks"47. As we can see,
the 1920s "loan shark" was not, as it had been before, a general representation of unregulated
money-lending, it was directly associated with one speciﬁc subset of practices which became the
critique's center of attention. These were loans made of the ﬁrst, "payday" type identiﬁed in
the previous section: the "loan shark" became in the 1920s strongly attached to the ﬁgure of
the "salary buyer" providing income advances to poor industrial workers 48, and which were
seen as operating mostly in the South of the country. After the initial passage of the USLL in
many States, a national set of aggressive crusades were carried against those "loan shark salary
buyers", which used to "reap millions from poor of the South" 49.
This ﬁght was primarily targeting the chain of agencies whose headquarters were based in
Atlanta, Georgia, and which were operating up to 700 agencies across the Southwest and up to
the Ohio River (see Figure 3) 50. As Leon Henderson, director of the Department of Remedial
Loan of the RSF in the 1920s, notices in 1926 : "Each time a city engages to prosecute a salary
buyer it instantly becomes known that Atlanta is the headquarters for this brand of wage eating
loan shark" 51. This chain company, referred to as the "Big Four" 52, had headquarters located in
downtown Atlanta, and they dominated the unsecured small loan business during the 1910s and
1920s. The campaigns against loan sharks in Atlanta had begun much earlier, the ﬁrst one dated
46Louis N Robinson, "Drastic cut in interest takes small loan world by storm, HFC Press, January 1929
47The Loan Shark Problem in Kansas, Kansas Legislative Council, Columbia University Archives.
48Soederberg [2014] mentions the role of "salary lenders" in the development of what the authors calls the
"poverty industry" ; yet her account of this economic practice is based on secondary data, and is highly simplistic.
It points, however, to the long term impact salary buying left on the collective imagery, as compared to their size
and circumscribed existence.
49"Sharks" exact millions from poor of south, Topeka Daily Capital, May 2 1926.
50These numbers are estimated according to various documents, both newspaper clippings and primary sources
documenting the legal cases involving branches of the Atlanta companies, see Appendix B.1 for more details.
51Salary Buying in Atlanta, Leon Henderson, 1926, RSF box 16.
52Which referred to its four principal loan men, Rufus DeWitt King, George E. Roesenbuch, and two brothers,
RS Ison and ID Ison
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back to 1903 53, and they went on continuously until 1934. However, these became the nation's
center of attention after the passage of the Georgia USLL in 1920 , and remained so until the mid
1930s. In that perspective, the passage of the USLL in Georgia in 1920 was only one step in the
process of local regulation : it gave legal support for small loans at the State level, but failed at
properly regulating unsecured loans made in the form of "salary purchases" 54. Hence, the law
was primarily seen as a resource which could be mobilized at the local level, to increase public
attention, obtain legal victories in lower courts, or get the support of local business leaders, and
in particular local employers, to stop dealing with "salary buying loan sharks".
The "loan shark" ﬁgure, during the 1920s, was not, as it had been before, a general repre-
sentation of the "usurer" in a industrial, urban society, but became closely attached nation-wide
to unregulated salary buyers operating from Atlanta, Georgia. Grand Juries are put together in
cities from Birmingham to Chicago to investigate the activities of the "Atlanta Big Four", radio
announcements warn the local citizens of their deviant practices 55, and nation-wide business and
labor leaders 56 recognize Atlanta as the new frontier of consumer credit regulation. The "Big
Four" have aroused a lot of fascination over the years, both at the time and in recent research 57,
but their actual business and organizational practices have not yet been properly documented.
Here we will document the local ﬁght against "salary buyers" in Georgia, even though one needs
to keep in mind the wider implications of these campaigns for the legitimization of the personal
loan business. The ﬁght carried by social reformers in Atlanta set the tone for other similar
endeavours country wide, and more generally this gives a very clear view of how the regulation
was thought and put into action by local actors after the passage of the State Law.
53Fulton County Grand Jury Report, 1903, op. cit.
54The best testimony to the diﬃculty of law implementation is given by JLR Boyd, president of the Atlanta
Legal Aid Society, and one of the most important actor in the regulation process. In August 1926, at the apex of
the loan shark crusade and 6 years after the passage of the USLL, he asks the Georgia Superintendent of Banks to
create a position and appoint him as "Superintendent of Small Loan Companies". He believes that this would give
reformers a more eﬃcient control over the business, and especially over salary buyers: this position would give
Boyd an arbitrary right to close down companies and nullify loan contracts, if these were suspected of usury. In
other terms, the reformers are trying to by-pass the lower court system, which didn't have the necessary common
law support to rule against salary buyers in cases of debt settlement. In reaction to the Superintendent's refusal
to do so, Boyd confesses : "my sense of 'frustration' increases", "it looks like I am the 'Moses' appointed to lead
Atlanta out of the small loan wilderness, but without the sanction of the Law . Letter Boyd to Henderson August
21 1926, RSF box 16.
55Salary Buying in Atlanta, op. cit.
56The Illinois Federation of Labor explicitly mention the "Atlanta Big Four" as responsible for the "salary
buying" evil. See "Businessmen open ﬁght against the loan sharks", Kansas Labor Weekly, February 10 1927.
57See citehyman2011,marron2009,soederberg2014
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In this perspective it is possible to give reasons as to why Atlanta became the national capital
of "salary buyers" and hence the "anti loan shark crusades" in the 1920s. The ﬁrst agencies of the
Big Four were set up in 1906 by a wealthy dry-food merchant and railroad businessman, Stephen
A. Ryan, and were operated by two young managers, a former lawyer and a former employee
of RG Dun Co. in Atlanta, RD King 58: both contributed to the business by the knowledge of
various aspect of credit and debt collection procedures. Atlanta had experienced a late industrial
boom, and was completely transformed by the railroad industry: a massive and late urbanization
along with wage earners settling in stable industry jobs, and this happened in a very segregated
city. Kuhn [2005] precisely described industry workers' lives and experiences during this period
in the city. The reformers successfully waged for the passage of the USLL in Georgia, but one
particular section (XVI) of the bill was never accepted, and it precisely dealt with the nature
of "wage sales" 59. According to social reformers, a transaction involving a purchase of wages
before these were earned, and a re-purchase of this money on payday by the worker had to be
considered as bona ﬁde loans 60, and hence subject to State usury regulations. They had to
be repaid on installment, with a speciﬁc repayment schedule ﬁxed by the legal annual interest
rate of 42%. These transactions, according to the RSF61, should be governed by the USLL and
justiﬁed no speciﬁc treatment. On the contrary, according to salary buyers, these transactions
had to be considered as regular commercial transactions62, and hence no regulation could limit
their conditions and prices 63. Reformers argued that in the case of small loans, borrowers and
lenders could not be considered as equal business partners : the terms of the transaction had to
be regulated because of this structural inequality between a thrifty but desperate worker64, in
need of small amounts of money to make ends meet or face an emergency, and a creditor which
had a monopoly on the trade of money in small sums. Hence, the national campaign against the
58Atlanta City Directory, 1910
59This was actually the case in most USLLs. The only State where salary buyers were only a minor issue
was Illinois, for the reason stated above that agencies formerly carrying these loans accepted the regulation and
specialized mostly in chattel loans.
60See Report on Wage assignment laws, Frank R. Hubachek, 1923. RSF Box 161 Folder "Wage Assignments
and Garnishment Laws Relating to".
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
63In the US, the 14th amendment, through it "Due protect clause", protects the right of individual to contract
from invasion by the Federal Government, and this argument is very often used to justify wage purchase as
legitimate transactions. "Validity of section 16 of the Uniform small Loan Act : Does section 16 violates due
process clause, in the sense that wages is a  chose  guaranteed by the 14th Amendment", RSF, Box 6 Folder
"Section 16 Validity".
64"Conference with salary buyers", March 5th 1926. RSF Box 16, 1926 Loan Shark Campaign (Boyd).
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salary buyers was not only a ﬁght against a speciﬁc subterfuge to avoid the law. "Salary buyers"
were at the center of what Gabriel Abend [2014] called the "public moral normativity", and
this needs to be understood as an important cultural and economic phenomenon. Transactions
carried by salary buyers were those of the "payday" plan, and they seem to poorly ﬁt the model
loan designed by reformers.
The "anti loan shark crusades" were carried both at the level of court action and in the public
sphere : the reformist organizations set up were closely related to the Legal Aid Movement and
local business ethics organizations, and the ﬁght was ﬁrst of all waged at the judicial level65 Social
reformers struggled to gather testimonies from borrowers who had been victims of sharks, but
they also investigated the practices of local credit agencies, and through these inquiries tried to
obtain rulings of usury in the lower courts, as well as lobby for more important decisions in higher
courts. Many of these dramatic cases related to "purchases" of wages made the newspapers in
the 1920s and early 1930s. Will Earle, an elderly workman employed by the Southern Railroad
Company, made the cover story of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution on August 7 1928 66.
He had been in the "clutches" of the Big Four between 1910 and 1928, and over the course of
these years had paid more than $1500 interests on an accumulated $ 76 loan, "without missing
a single month". In 1926, at the apex of the crusades, the story of "Uncle Burl Parrish", "an
old time darkie"67, is reproduced in papers country wide 68. He borrowed $10 and paid back
$2 a week for three years, for a total of $312, "without whittling down the principal a penny".
Uncle Burl suddenly becomes, in the most dramatic gesture, the symbol of these "millions poor
of South", "held ﬁnancial slaves" by the loan sharks 69 This is no coincidence, the reformers had
a very clear political strategy, they staged these cases as a series of "scandals" to arouse the
readers' opinion, and by doing so targeted some credit practices, as both morally unacceptable
and economically unsound 70. It is interesting to see that cases involving African Americans are
65These general characteristics are objectiﬁed from the 305 campaigns listed in RSF, Box 121 Folder "Loan
shark campaigns before 1923".
66AJC Archives, Atlanta Fulton Public Library
67"South begins war on salary buyers", Providence Rhode Island Journal, May 2 1926
68We found his story in newspaper published in Wilmington DL, Topeka KA, Peoria IL, Syracuse NY, Provi-
dence RI, Cincinnati OH and Saint Louis MI ; with similar terms and staged along what appear like standardized
criticisms.
69"South begins war on salary buyers", op. cit.
70These crusades were so numerous that the Foundation would issue pre-established binders to local reformers
to carry their own "anti loan shark" ﬁght. These pamphlets include pre-written documents with "typical" loan
shark stories, with blanks were left out and which were supposed to be ﬁlled with names, jobs and amounts of
interest rates. They also include many strategic advice regarding the type of communication to follow in order to
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more commonly made visible in this perspective, while at the same time race, as a structural
dimension of credit relations, is rarely analyzed as such by social reformers. This illustrates well
the paternalistic rhetoric often resorted to in "loan shark" narratives, where poor borrowers are
presented as irrational, and the sharks most vulnerable victims precisely for this reason. Proper
testimonies of African Americans documenting their vision, uses and justiﬁcation of "loan shark"
credit are as rare as their sporadic scandalous appearances are common. Uncle Burl's story is
both scandalous and ridiculed, an ambiguity characteristic of the type of discourse found in "loan
shark" narratives : he, "who looks as though he could have been a body guard to general Robert
E. Lee, needed money because his "chillun was hungry"". The emphasis put on his physical
appearance and poor language and grammatical skills seem to underline his social status, that
of an "an ignorant negro". "You may wonder" why he "would continue to pay week after week",
asked JLR Boyd, and, so it seems, the vulnerability caused by this general ignorance makes
the necessity of reform even more stringent. These fragile wage earners, whose "money is being
wrung out of [their] blood", are not necessarily illegitimate borrowers, but the type of small, pay
day salary loans avaible to them makes their credit highly immoral71.
Paradoxically, the links between loan sharks and social reformers are much less tenuous
than what could be expected of the aforedescribed scandalization campaigns. This was already
mentioned in the case of Illinois, but it is conﬁrmed by the analysis of the Georgia campaigns.
3.3 Moral conﬂicts about the small loan market, what is "unnecessary
borrowing"?
Studying the interactions of social reformers and unregulated lenders is interesting because it
emphasizes irreconcilable visions of credit "worth", its goals and legitimacy.
Leaders of the salary buyers were interested in the legal reforms of the small loan business:
they attended social and legal conferences organized by the RSF 72, requested pamphlets 73,
and read the same jurisprudence. In 1926, salary buyers eventually tried to design a model of
regulation that would set a legal framework for their transactions, and legitimize the type of
money advances they were providing. They submitted this draft to representatives of the RSF,
insure maximal eﬃciency. See Folder "Campaigns on loan sharks, outlined steps". Binder sent to the Winston
Salem Journal. RSF, box 120
71"South begins war on salary buyers", op. cit.
72"Conference with salary buyers", meeting minutes, JLR Boyd, president of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society,
1926, RSF Box 16
73Letter E.H. French to W.N. Finley, chairman of NFRLA, June 20 1912, RSF, box 123, Folder "EH French"
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and JLR Boyd, the president of the Atlanta Anti Loan Shark Legal Aid Society, which believed
that "if they[salary buyers] were ﬁrmly convinced of the necessity of their business and the high
rate shared, that [a] proposition be presented to the Foundation", keeping in mind that "the
burden of proof was on them 74. Regulated lenders opened the meeting held in 1926 by trying
to show the representatives of salary buyers, "by their balance sheets, that there was a better
return on capital invested in a legitimate chattel loan business than in the risky salary buying
business. The salary buyers replied that they have tried to switch to this regulated form of
business, converting all their agencies in the city of Pittsburgh ; and this experience proved to be
failure, as "only 3% of his customers were retained and they have lost "$6000 in three months.
RD King "emphasized this several times during our conversation as ﬁnal and lasting proof of his
contention that the salary buyers served a group that the chattel lender could not and would
not undertake to reach, bu his argument is not picked up on by the reformers. As salary buyers
point to the reality of the segmentation of loan practices and a corresponding hierarchy of small
loan borrowers, social reformers dismiss the discussion as follows : "we discussed at some length
the anti-social eﬀect of salary buying, because I insisted that, no matter how it was disguised
or explained, the cost of such loans was a severe drain of the family budget and, being a waste,
was responsible for a serious reduction in standard of living. As we see, the argument is here a
fairly arbitrary and abstract one, it resembled in particular the type of reasoning made against
the regulation of the small loan business at the beginning of the century. The legitimacy of these
economic practices is very clearly denied by social reformers : "we think that there are many
useless and improvident loans caused by the fact that a man has opportunity to get a loan on his
salary. We would rather substitute a credit union or a company loan fund or some other lending
mechanism for necessary loans and will work for these 75. Here, it is the business legitimacy
of the "payday plan which is directly criticized ; if these practices are to be made legitimate,
it would have to be outside of the market, or with non-market forms, such as cooperative or
corporate credit.
The proposal made by salary buyers was that of a fee-based system, where each interest would
be paid at the beginning of the transaction, as a discount on the loan, with a cost proportional
to the amount of money loaned. It implied a varying interest rate, and the rate would be charged
as a discount, not a as ﬁxed annual rate. The reformers replied that "a sliding scale of charges
to be made dependent upon the size of the loan, I explained that such an idea was out of the
74"Conference with salary buyers" op. cit.
75Idem
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question for several reasons, providing a series of technical legal reasons for this, which do not
tackle directly the structural hierarchies of practices. "By going over this [legal and technical]
ground, I hoped to impress them with the diﬃculties which any legislation designed to regulate
salary buying would encounter 76.
The reformers' arbitrary stance against "salary lending" was actually quite widespread, as
Robinson and Nugent [1935] explain : "The salary lender was generally in disrepute and to a
large extent justly so. While the Foundation did not expressly try to prevent the use of salaries as
security, salary lending had caused so much hardship in the past that it looked with equanimity
on the limitations which the rate put on the use of this form of security. According to them,
chattel mortgages are simply known to better securities than plain notes or wage assignments
: "lenders of small sums tended to avoid the burden of visiting the home of the borrower to
identify the furniture mortgaged and took the less burdensome, if also less secured, method
of lending on salaries or plain notes". This is very much at odds with our previous analyses
of wage assignment procedures, which required thorough inquiry into the work status of the
borrower, and complicated organizational and legal proceedings in cases of default. And even
though the authors also share the "conviction" that salary lending may lead to "thoughtless
and unnecessary borrowing" 77, they still conclude in a puzzling way: "the case of the salary
lender, [...] has probably never been adequately studied. The persistence of salary lending in
unregulated states and the ability of salary buyers in regulated states to build up huge businesses
in a few years show that the demand for small salary loans still exists.
These debates emphasize two diﬀerent visions of the small loan business, oﬀered by social
reformers on the one hand and salary buyers on the other, and this echoes the comments of the
Baltimore observer mentioned earlier. Salary buyers were putting forward a form of structural
debt : the "payday plan" was oﬀering what could be anachronistically deﬁned as a small lines
of credit, perpetually renewed at regular periods. The Illinois data of 1917 conﬁrms that the
smaller loan were in fact often "treasury" loans, loans made to consolidate existing debt, keep
up with expenses or bills, or generally "tie until payday". Social reformers opposed this model,
and were pushing for a more exceptional type of debt : loans made on installments were unique
transactions, not renewable a priori, as the principal was supposed to be repaid gradually. These
loans were supposed to be made when families were facing emergencies or an unforeseen event,
which implicitly suggested that family budgets were not supposed to rely on small loans. The
76Idem
77Robinson and Nugent [1935] p. 174
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separation between secured and unsecured lending closely matched this legitimacy divide in the
1920s : "salary purchases" represented the most dire form of structural indebtedness, and in that
sense were unacceptable to the reformers.
The two reasons put forward by small loan reformers to push for the adoption of a purely
secured form of personal loans are, one the one hand, the greater risk attached to unsecured
lending, and on the other hand, that salary loans are more "exploitative" and put more strain of
the borrowers, than chattel mortgages. We ﬁnd no traces of such positions up until the 1920s,
even among social reformers : the legitimacy of secured lending seemed to be a product of the
regulation and the stigmatization of lower, unsecured, salary loans made to lower classes of the
population. Indeed, the idea that chattel mortgages are safer than wage assignment titles is much
more complex that what is put forward by the Foundation, and early commentators were very
much aware of the riskiness of small chattel loans. In 1918, a New York credit men, in justifying
the necessity of higher rate for small loans, mentioned the very high "Chattel mortgage risks", as,
"in event of foreclosure, title of borrower to household furniture may be claimed by an installment
furniture house, or by a relative of relatives", while it is also likely "that the landlord will obtain
a priori lien for rent in arrears, or distrain upon and sell the furniture". "This frequently has
occurred, notwithstanding warranty of ownership of freedom from liens, made in each application
for loan and chattel mortgage" 78. Indeed, the property of objects among the working class was
far from a stabilized notion at the time, and it was hard for small loan lenders to make sure
that they were no previous claims made on items pledged :79 objects would sometimes be used
to leverage multiple loans from multiple lenders, while it was also a very common practice to
pawn an object or piece of furniture which belonged to a neighbor or a relative 80. Regarding
78Charles S. Francis,"Why A Higher Rate of Charges than the bank rate of interest is necessary on small loan",
NFRLA Publication, NY. RSF Folder Kentucky 1918.
79Companies such as the Chattel Mortgage Reporter Inc. were hired as intermediaries by the lenders to gather
information on the property pledged by applicants, and the inquiring process seemed to be quite uncertain.(see
Letter from Chattel Mortgage Reporter Inc. To Imperial Credit Co., August 15 1926, HFC, Folder John Watson
Files). In 1903, a railroad employee of Atlanta, "who pays no more than a poll tax", was subject to 98 diﬀerent
claims on his goods, from both furniture dealers and money lenders, and consequently only few of his creditors
were able to settle their claims (see Fulton County Grand Jury Report, 1903, op. cit.). For an analysis of similar
processes in France, see Albert [2014], chapter 8.
80In October 1903, the house of two young 20-year old women is levied upon in Atlanta, and all the furniture
is taken away. They had inherited those from their late mother and the father had signed chattel mortgages on
them, from multiple lenders (AJC Archives, October 7 1903). They would eventually get the goods back, which
was not the case of another African American housewife, whose story is reported by WB Lackey, working as a
collector for the Dixie Loan Company. Mother of six, her husband had pledged all of her furniture in order to
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the exploitative nature of "salary loans", it is interesting to notice that early critiques of money
lenders rather thought the contrary. In 1903, the Grand Jury set up by the Fulton County
District Court of Georgia, to study and report the "Evil growing out of present methods of the
Money Sharks", found that "salary assignments" loans were usually made to more stable and
well-oﬀ workers, while chattel mortgages were more commonly found among the "helpless and
defenseless"81.
As we see, the legitimacy of secured chattel loans over unsecured salary loans is strongly
linked to the enforcement of the USLL in the 1920s. In our opinion, this element in inseparable
from the change in the average amounts lent by regulated agencies : chattel mortgages were
not more legitimate per se, but only to the extent that they were made to a more middle
class fraction of the borrowers. This close tie between the type of collateral and the amount
of the loan transpired through the various discourses of reformers and small loan lenders alike,
which intertwine constantly the two dimensions : smaller loans, loans to the poor, salary loans
are inherently exploitative and chattel loans are the only one able to enhance the consumers'
welfare82. The struggle against "salary buyers" built a close tie between unsecured lending for the
lower classes, and the dispossession of a wage earner's capacity to support himself and his family.
The modern loan shark, by seizing the worker's income, prevented him or her from earning a
"living wage", and it had to be eradicated. And at the same time, the regulation, by focusing
mostly on higher, chattel loans, produced a segmentation of credit which excluded unsecured
lending from the sphere legitimate practices, and the populations for which these forms of credit
was the only option.
secure loans, after which he left the city, and, most of her goods having been levied upon, she was "left with
nothing but the bare ﬂoor on which to sleep" (Forgery Laid to Money Lender AJC Archives, March 5 1904).
81See Report of Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury, to the Judge of superior court of Fulton County, 1903.
Several newspaper stories further seem to exemplify this fact, such as the story of Mariah Curry reported in 1903.
The young African American resident of Atlanta took out a $ 6.50 loan to the Walton Loan Company, secured by
a mortgage on her "household goods". When she was late on her payments, the company wanted to foreclose the
furniture, but "she prevented the bailiﬀ from levying on her household goods". As a result, she was arrested, and
had to leave her child and her infant without care at her place. It took two weeks for the woman to be released on
bond, and when she returned home the infant had passed and her second child was in critical condition ("Negro
Woman Bound Over", AJC Archives, May 26 1903).
82The justiﬁcation most commonly found for such a separation targets the procedures of wage assignment,
which are, at the time, seen as modern forms of "slavery", and echoed the luring presence of "unfree labor".
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3.4 Identifying the eﬀects of this regulation on the segmentation of
credit
Indeed, these conﬂicting visions were not only ideological, and one of the main eﬀect of the
regulation campaigns was the restriction of the type of collateral accepted as security from
regulated lenders. We have already emphasized the change in the average amount and the
distribution of loans which came with the regulation, but other consequences may be identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst major consequence was a legal one: even though salary buying had beneﬁted from
a poorly deﬁned status in the USLL, the campaigns of social reformers started having an impact
through court decisions during the 1920s. Justices of the Peace were replaced in many States
(notably Georgia and Illinois) by Municipal courts [Willrich, 2003], whose judges both had a
better knowledge of the law and were more sympathetic to "social" ills, and in particular usury.
These progressive courts started ruling against "salary buying", making it more and more diﬃcult
for unregulated credit agencies to operate : in 1929, municipal courts in Georgia ruled against
salary buyers in 75% of related cases 83, and one important case, ruled by the Georgia Supreme
court in 1926, severely aﬀected the legal support of the loan sharks' business 84.
Secondly, data shows that regulated lenders eﬀectively specialized very early in the 1920s
in secured chattel mortgages, and very few examples of unsecured lending made by licensed
lenders can be found after the 1910s 85. Following the mid-1920s confrontations with social
reformers and the more stringent legal context, the head of the Atlanta salary buyers, RD
King, made the decision to abandon the business of "salary buying" and purchase a license as a
"personal ﬁnance company"86, which started operating in 1929. He used his 25-year experience
in the small loan business as a marketing tool to issue bonds and showcase the soundness of his
endeavor in the matter : once the king the of the Sharks, RD King eventually became in his
later life the State hero of consumer ﬁnance 87, emphasizing, in the case of money lending, the
attachment of moral discourses with practices rather than individuals. The ﬁrst annual report of
his regulated company shows a great majority of secured loans, almost all of them tied to chattel
titles on furniture, as these represent 93% of the companies' yearly assets 88. Additionally,
83See Letter Boyd to Henderson, May 1929, RSF, Box 15
84"Usury Loan Judgement Upheld in higher court", AJC Archives, December 22 1927
85Only case of wage assignment was based on local necessities, Missouri , because they were facing the com-
petition of salary buyers, but publicly they would always argue against it. HFC Archives, Folder NA 0102/036 :
ledgers and applications.
86RSF, Box 81, Folder Fulton Industrial Society.
87"Rufus DeWitt King, Booster of Georgia", AJC Archives, April 24 1933
88Security Bankers Finance Corporation, First Annual Report, p7, "Assets and Liabilities", June 1928. RSF,
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loans are made to "7310 families" for an average amount of $140.57, which shows a very abrupt
upward shift compared to the earlier, 1926 practices: the new company is specializing from the
beginning in loans of higher amounts, and the rhetoric is more directly targeting married couples,
than individual workers. On a more general level, Robinson and Nugent [1935] notice the same
tendency : an entire chapter of their landmark study of consumer credit in the 1930s is dedicated
to the "Change in type of security". Even though data was, according to them, diﬃcult to gather
on all States, they still notice a major change in States where statistics are well reported. As
an example, in Massachussetts in 1913, 78% of small loans were unsecured, whereas after the
passage of the State Law, in 1926, these represent only 3% of loans made, the overwhelming
majority being secured chattel loans. According to them, the end of the "loan shark era" and
the "advent of regulation" 89 brought about this change.
It is very diﬃcult to evaluate the impact of the regulation of the racial distribution of clients,
both because company records, even for regulated lenders, are scarce, and because very few kept
information on this issue. However, some examples can be given to convey an idea of the impact
: the ﬁrst regulated credit company created in Georgia after the early crusades against the loan
sharks reported data on the racial proﬁle of its clients, and whereas African Americans were
central actors the small loan business in the beginning of the century, they only represent 90
of the 1250 borrowers of this licensed lender after two years of operation 90. On the opposite,
there are 807 white married men among these customers, and 260 white women, most of them
are either divorced or widowers. Later in time, in 1931, the Annual Report of the Atlanta Thrift
Society reﬂected on the consequences of the regulation of the small loan business: according to
the reformers, "[t]he situation of the colored clients is truly deplorable. The Loan Shark is afraid
of the white man now, but still is brutally domineering and threatening over the negro. Due
to the work of this society, the white man now only pays usury voluntarily, because paymasters
back up the law. Unfortunately, particularly in some railroad yards,  Straw Bosses  here and
there, are caught  bawling out  negro workmen for alleged improvidence when the truth is,
that negroes of Atlanta live very economically" 91. This report shows that the regulation seemed
Box 123 Folder RD King
89Robinson and Nugent [1935], p170
90There are 18 women and 72 men among those borrowers. Second Annual Report of the "Atlanta Saving and
Loan Company (the Anti Loan shark Bank)" 1912, RSF Box 95 folder "Atlanta Loan And Saving's company".
91Annual Report of the Atlanta Thrift Society, 1931. RSF, Box 15, Folder 1931 Loan Shark Campaign. We do
not take for granted the above citation, in particular, we tend to believe that even though the role of employers in
protecting white workers has played a role, the specialization of small loan lenders in chattel mortgages played an
even greater one in this racial division. Moreover, this statement is interesting because it documents the public
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successful in protecting white age earners from the "loan sharks", who were now distinctively
seen as dealing with African American populations 92
In addition to this, the regulation strongly impacted the geographical distribution of regulated
and unregulated lenders. As we have seen, small loan lenders, and in particular the two largest
providers 93 were very strongly implanted in the Midwest and the North East, but never really
developed in the South or the West. To objectify these dynamics, we have used various data
sources to map the distribution of lenders by States, and while it is hard to gather exhaustive
data on this distribution, various evidence still show compelling results. The following maps
on Figure 3 show the national distribution of salary lenders and licensed small loan lenders by
States for the year 1926. We have chosen this particular date as a point of comparison for several
reasons. First of all, this was the peak of both the "salary buying" business and the campaigns
waged against it, and consequently it provides the most accurate data on agencies and their
location (see appendices for a description of data collection). Among licensed lenders, we have
chosen to only map companies which were members of the AASLB, the professional association
of personal ﬁnance companies. These represent only a small fraction of the lenders 94, but still
give an accurate representation of the relative spatial distribution of oﬃces.
The maps of Figure 3 clearly show that regulated lenders were mostly doing business on
a North East- Midwest corridor, whereas unregulated salary buyers were operating along a
Southwest-Minnesota belt. This is not only interesting in relative terms, as the number of
regulated small loan lenders operating (without restriction to the National Federation members)
in States outside of the identiﬁed corridor is very small : in 1926, there were only 25 licensed
lenders in Georgia, and 9 in the State of Florida, and none in Alabama.
In the end of the 1920s, the regulation had translated in a market divide the two types of loans
previously identiﬁed among practices of early century loan sharks. On the one hand, regulated
perception, at the one of social reformers, after the regulation (i.e. the passage of the USLL and the enforcement
period.
92This seems to be contradictory with Martha Olney [1998], as she emphasized than African American customers
of installment buying companies were more often given secured contracts, than unsecured ones. However, these
as quite diﬀerent markets, and "wage assignments" are far from a "word", as we have seen, for lenders they were
often seen as better securities than chattel goods. Moreover, most of her results concerning the South of the US
were not signiﬁcant, making it diﬃcult to compare the results.
93HFC and Beneﬁcial Loan Corporation, which was bought later by the former.
94Some comprehensive State data exist, and for these States the fraction of licensed small loan lenders which
are members of the AASLB is constant. As we are only interested in the country wide relative distribution, this
proxy seems to be a suﬃcient measure.
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Figure 3: Maps of small loan lenders. Top : Licensed Lenders // Middle : Salary Buyers //
Bottom : HFC
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small loan lenders, which carried transactions for larger amounts of money and lending mostly
on personal property, operating mostly in the North and the eastern part of the Midwest, and on
the other hand, unregulated lenders specializing in unsecured loans, of lower amounts, trading all
over the South and the west of the Midwest. This evolution was far from a natural consequence of
the legal framework designed in the late 1910s, rather, the softness of the law regarding the actual
organizational practices required from lenders created a conﬂict among lending organization to
deﬁne what were sound business practices for personal loans. "Salary buying" never became a
legitimate economic practice, neither as part of the larger USLL framework, nor was there such
a thing as a separate "unsecured" regulated loan business, and in the 1930s the regulated small
loan lending was very clearly associated with, both in discourses and organizational practices,
secured loans of relatively high amounts.
4 The market for Personal Loans : unsecured lending as a
legitimate banking activity
At the end of the 1920s, the regulation of credit had accomplished a few things. Laws were passed,
professional associations were set up and the largest organized group of salary buyers syndicates
had been dismantled. It is hard to evaluate whether this evolution increased or decreased the
overall amount of lending, as data is only available for regulated small loan lenders in some States.
Neither will we draw conclusions on the "democratization" of consumer credit [Prasad, 2012],
or on the birth of "credit as welfare" for American consumers [Hyman, 2011, Trumbull, 2014].
Our moral sociology approach rather tried to show that "loan sharks" didn't represent illegal or
illegitimate credit in general, but rather a speciﬁc type of -legally unclear- unsecured, payday
to payday lending very much opposed the model type of personal loans supported by social
reformers. The specialization of small loan lenders in secured loans did not come from an early
and clear reform idea: we ﬁnd no sign of this argument in the RSF's discussions. Quite on the
contrary, they were trying to design legitimate loans available to all "wage earners" 95. It rather
seems that the focus on business ethics, transparency and a scientiﬁc approach to the calculation
of an optimal rate, produced the separation between secured and unsecured loans, because the
former seemed to ﬁt more directly the spirit (and text) of the regulation. This separation was
ingrained to such an extent that the expression "chattel lenders" became synonymous of all
95Arthur Ham, Campaign against loan sharks, op. cit.
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regulated small loan lending in the early 1930s96. And, if in the early 1930s, small loan lenders
were the most important actor of the small loan market, two decades later, most of the business
has been taken over by commercial banks. Whereas in 1929, small loan lender handle 86% of
loans made on the regulated market 97,an NBER study 98 of 1939 shows that Personal Loan
Departments handled over 69 million dollars in loans at that point, compared to the 346 millions
for small loan lenders. In 1946, PLD overpass the latter, and this trend continued into the 1950s
: the ultimate symbol of this take-over being the decision of HFC to abandon the personal loan
business in the late 1950s 99.
The following section will be devoted to the analysis of this take-over, with a special emphasis
on organizational and moral dimensions of the business model adopted by commercial banks.Our
goal here is to describe in details the "ideal" loan designed by commercial bankers and regulators
between 1931 and the mid 1940s, showing that this model implied a much more direct selection
of borrowers and loan types. We will show that, as a result of the 1929 crisis, one of the
major goals for bankers was to re-establish their place as a legitimate ﬁnancial intermediary, and
this undertaking implied the construction of "personal loans" as a legitimate banking activity,
distinguished as much as possible from money-lending, whether regulated or unregulated.
4.1 Consumer credit in disrepute after the 1930s crisis: "foul" bankers,
and "legal usurers"
Commercial banks started expressing an interest in loans to individual consumers in the 1920s,
but this was limited to a few local experiences (Hyman [2011], chapter 3). The major impulse
came from the Federal Housing Administration, which decided to carry, in 1934, a "Modernization
Credit Plan" 100, as part of a general endeavor to stimulate credit and the economy. This
plan included both "Industrial and business loans, up to $50 000" and "Character Loans, up to
$2000" - unsecured loans based solely on the borrower's "character" - and the federal government
would guarantee the loan up to 20% of the principal 101. Here we are chieﬂy interested in the
latter "character loans" : those were not loans of unaﬀected money, there were supposed to be
96See Walter B. French, Small Loans, an investment for banks, p 10. Small Loan Committee of the New Jersey
Bankers Association, 1936. RSF Box 98 folder Publicity 1936.
97Along with credit union and employers' plans
98SL Miller, "The Banking Invasion of the Consumer credit ﬁeld. Credit Buying on increase", The Annalist,
August 8 1940.
99Herman Kogan, Lending is our business, the story of HFC,p. 100, 1965. HSBC Archives
100RSF, Box 98 Folder FHA formula
101The amended Modernization Credit Plan, Title I of the NHA, amended by Congress on may 28 1935
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made for "modernization purposes", and in particular "home improvements", such as purchasing
household equipment or carrying small construction work within the home. Many banks started
making "character loans" for purposes of modernization, and, even though this policy known
as "Title I loans", stopped in 1937, they continued investing in this new ﬁeld. Louis Hyman
has studied the switch from aﬀected Title I loans to unaﬀected "personal loans" : the FHA
credit program had shown bankers they could secure a proﬁt out of making unsecured lending
to individual consumers, and they "naturally" started opening Personal Loan Departments to
provide small loans, with, this time, no investment requirements. We would like to argue,
however, that this "natural"switch from Title I to PLD was not only a consequence of the FHA
program. Indeed, the way bankers discussed and designed their new consumer lending activity
both directly relates to the earlier debates about the regulation of personal loans, and represents
an important step in the legitimization of a market for unsecured lending.
Although bankers and professionals of the banking industry had strong disagreements, most
of them directly opposed and criticized regulated small loan lenders, while on the contrary they
very rarely spoke of "loan sharks". Interestingly, some bankers had perceived that small loan
lenders, by focusing mostly on relatively high chattel mortgages, had somehow lost their original
purpose. Myron Bone writes in the Industrial Banker of October 1942 that: "Licensees under
the various small loan laws have not been serving the purpose for which they were created,
"[i]f the RSF is honestly interested in improving "the social and living conditions in the US",
it will direct its research to the preparation of treatises on the need for reducing the maximum
loan of the licensed lender to $200 or even $150, with the further requirement that a deﬁnite
percentage must be made below $50". And the uncompromising judgment, "The petty money
lenders induced state legislatures to enact their bill on the grounds that they would drive the
illegal loan sharks out of existence and would serve the needs of individuals needing small sums
of money for short periods of time. They failed, utterly, in both instances. They make few of
the smaller loans and, in fact, some of the larger chains try to avoid all loans under $100 102.
According to the author, banks should be the legitimate provider of consumer loans to relatively
better oﬀ consumers, while small loan lenders, in order to keep up with their original social
purpose, should try to redirect their activity towards very small loan amounts.
In the 1930s, credit, in very general terms, had suﬀered a severe blow from the ﬁnancial crisis.
Regulated lenders made every eﬀort possible to emphasize that, contrary to commercial banks,
102Myron Bone,"The pattern for new law appears", Industrial Banker, n5 VIII, October 1st 1942
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they had roamed through the crisis without much damage 103. Their specialization on chattel
loans might account at least partly for such a good track record, as they were less dependent on
their borrowers' income in cases of default. Thus, the eﬀect of the crisis on the small loan business
seem to have been more symbolic than material at ﬁrst. The relatively high USLL rate of 42%
annual started to be strongly criticized as a form of "legal usury", and the expression "42% loan
sharks" - referring to the annual USLL rate of 42% - quickly spread in the public debate 104 . The
oxymoron "legal usury", would have been nonsensical in the 1910s and 1920s, and its appearance
shows a strong evolution from the earlier period : it seems that the legitimacy regulated lenders
had slowly struggled to build up around legal regulation, was directly challenged in the early
1930s. The ﬁght against the "42 percenters" was, among others, lead by congressman Fiorello
LaGuardia, in line with his more general crusades against ﬁnanciers 105, these "foul birds of
prey". Their main goal was to reduce the legal small loan rate below its historic 42% cap. In
a piece entitled "Usury : the curse of humanity" 106, the soon-to-be mayor of NYC, deplored
that since 1914 "money lenders and usurers have had pretty much their own way". According to
him, "regarding the history of usury in this country we must admit that a great deal of progress
has been made, and what we are complaining of today are the methods and the devices which
are the result of the anti-usury crusades". The congressman then spends some time scorning
"legalized usury", as, according to him, these loans bear "no risk" for the lenders : "the loan
shark covers himself either by actual possession of chattels as security or by actual bill of sale of
household eﬀects, even the baby's cradle, or by complete assignment of wages. The loan shark
takes absolutely no chance. He practically gets his money before he gives it". We see that here
the "loan sharks" encompass both earlier salary buyers and regulated chattel lenders, proving the
ﬂuidity of the expression. "Since the depression of 1929, the curse has been accentuated", and
"legalized ﬁnancial institutions, with their assumed, hypocritical air of rendering public service
and engaging in philanthropy", proceed to "installment trickery", this "systematized plan of
oppression". The author speciﬁcally targets the largest provider of small loans, the Household
Finance Corporation, and the legislatures which have been deluded "by the glib sophistries of
103A report of the Chicago Journal of Commerce on HFC notes that "continued progress has been recorded by
the company over the period of several years, uninterrupted by the incidence of depression". Among reasons given
by the analysis stand: "the conservation expansion policy, economical operation, reasonable rates and a constant
factor of security for loans made". "HFC", Chicago Journal of Commerce, December 12 1931.
104See, for instance, "Legalized loan sharks are raising huge slush funds according to recent reports" Atlanta
News, October 14 1932.
105See Zinn [2010] chap 15.
106Brass Tacks, October 1932.
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this hand of plunderers", then calling for the same legislatures to "drive this loan-mongering
crew, not back to the Curb, but to the gutter where they belong". This account goes contrary
to some narratives which tend to see moral progress in the market, or legitimization processes,
as linear ones, with no hick-ups or reorientation [Hyman, 2011, Trumbull, 2014, Zelizer, 1983,
Calder, 2009]107. As we have seen, the struggle against loan sharks and the consequential design
of the personal loan business is far from a linear one. In particular, the various crusades led by
the RSF against loan sharks up until the 1920s have not democratized or legitimized consumer
lending : if one takes a picture of the moral debates in the early 1930s, the various regulations
seem to have rather generated more doubt and reluctance about the possible beneﬁts or small
consumer loans.
In the early 1930s, a series of State laws were, which either reduced the legal small loan rate
(Robinson and Nugent [1935], p 118) to very low levels, or canceled usury exemptions altogether.
And, parallel to this, we observe a strong decline in the number of licensed lenders in the 1930s.
Whereas it is diﬃcult to ascertain the direct causes of these drops - moral backﬁre, slow take-over
by banks, or decrease in legal rates - small loan lending was clearly declining in the 1930s 108.
While it diﬃcult to assess the overall impact of the crisis and these symbolic attacks on the small
loan business, this growing distrust of regulated lenders fuelled the interest of commercial banks
in investigating loans made to individual consumers.
4.2 Commercial banks and the sense of "community", status entry in
a discredited business
As we have seen, the consumer lending side of the FHA program spurred the interest commercial
bankers started having in personal loans in the early 1930s. However, the aftermath of the 1929
crisis also played a role in the way bankers talked about, and conceived their role in the ﬁnancial
system, which, according to them, had to be renewed. The vice-president of a St Louis national
107Governor FD Roosevelt seemed to have had quite similar views on regulated small loans, see "How Personal
Finance Helped the Government meet a National Emergency", AASLB Publication January 1935, RSF Box 88 ;
see also [Baradaran, 2015], p. 45.
108Whereas the amount of loans outstanding had been steadily increasing in Georgia since 1900, reaching 5.9
million dollars, these number sharply decrease to a level of 1 million in 1936 and $350 000 in 1940. In Georgia,
a law had been passed in 1935 to decrease the legal to 1.5%, but as we see, the decrease in activity was already
on the way. In Illinois, where no such legal drawback happen, the amount of loans outstanding start slowly
decreasing in 1930, from a maximum level of 40 million dollars, to a level of 33.5 millions in 1940. RSF, Box 57
Folder Georgia Summaries Volume of loans outstanding and size of average loan. Folder Illinois, idem
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bank clearly expresses this new vision in the journal of the American Banker Association : "[i]n
its broad aspect, the function of a bank is to help the people of the community solve their
ﬁnancial problems. The bank, looked upon as a community leader, is expected to promote those
things which will help make the community a better place to live" (1929, 8157). Banks are, at
the time, highly criticized for being, at least partly, responsible for the 1929 crisis 109 and one of
the way they wished to react was to extend their business to personal loans made to individuals.
In his address speech, the president of the Financial Advertisers Association, a collective put
together to work speciﬁcally on the public image of the banking system and institutions, clearly
stated that "extending personal loans" will help "recapture the bank's in the nation's ﬁnancial
structure". Although there is a large consensus among bankers that they will not make a great
proﬁt out of this activity 110, this is not only a purely symbolic or marketing issue. Many bank
leaders expressed they intention to provide a speciﬁc type of service as part of a extension of
banking operations, those are "loans for the little fellow", loans "fair to the working man", as an
editor of the Burroughs Clearing House puts it 111. The president of a large Nebraska bank asks
the question in a address given at the Mid West Conference of the ABA in 1936 : "[i]f 85 per
cent of the people in America do not have credit established or available at commercial banks,
are we not, as bankers, overlooking a very real service opportunity, as well as a source of revenue
that is constant, legitimate, and absolutely fair to the borrower, as well as being helpful to him
?"112. The idea that banks could make a proﬁt and provide an helpful service to consumers
is not strictly a post-crisis reaction, but it became generally accepted as a legitimate endeavor
during the decade following the crisis.
Bankers argue that, being more competitive ﬁnancial institutions than small loan lenders,
they could provide the same type of service for lower interest rates. As a New Jersey bankers
puts in 1928, "we are now conﬁdent that such loans may be made proﬁtably at a rate of interest
of 6%, provided they are treated in a business-like manner and thoroughly investigated" 113.
This 6% rate became in the late 1930s and early 1940s the industry standard (see section 4.3),
109F. Laguardia op. cit., and see more generally Baradaran [2015], chapter 2 and 3.
110"Consumer Credit Phantasia", an address given by Roger Steﬀan - one of the leading banker at the origin
of the FHA lending program [Hyman, 2011] - at the convention of the Georgia Banker Association, is a good
illustration of this idea : according to him, it was well known that proﬁts will be small, volume would have to be
large, and the Depression will hinder, at ﬁrst, the development of the industry. RSF, Box 98 Folder "Abuses"
111"Loans for the little fellow", Fred Barton, Burroughs Clearing House June 1st 1927
112"Mid Western Banks Discover big proﬁts in Small Loans", American Banker, March 21 1935.
113"Personal Loan Departments in Banks : How they have solved the problem left by the discredited loan
sharks". President of the Hudson County National Bank,Journal of Industry, 1928.
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and non-deposit institutions, such as regulated lenders, could not compete with that price, even
if some of them where big enough to be incorporated 114.
This take-over was also seen as a way for bankers to build a legitimate business of personal
loans, an endeavour at which all preceding attempts, and in particular regulated small loan
lending, had failed in the long run. Gunnar Trumbull [2014], in a recent book, argued that banks
beneﬁted from the legitimacy struggles carried by social reformers, and in particular the RSF ;
that they entered the game in the 1930s, using their economic advantages to build a monopoly
on the business, and push former small loan lenders out of the picture. According to us, this
vision is quite misleading: as we have seen, the business of small loans was far from being stably
legitimized in the 1930s, and banks much rather used their status to bring respectability back to
a discredited business. Consumers "trust bankers, and, where the choices was given them to do
their consumer credit business with banks or other special licensed lenders, many chose banks",
according to Walter B. French, president of the Consumer Loans Department of the ABA 115.
This is also acknowledged by leaders of the small loan industry: commenting on the expansion
of Personal Loan Departments of commercial banks in 1939, the president of the Household
Finance Corporation, argued that : "the entrance of commercial banks into this type of lending
has beneﬁted the small loan business. The banks have added their prestige to a business which
has labored under the prejudice against money lenders  a stubborn hold over from the not
far distant days when the wage earner could seldom get an emergency loan except from an
illegal lender. Prestige and good will are valuable assents in any business. To the extent that
personal loan departments of banks have helped to break down prejudices, therefore, they have
been helpful to the small loan companies" 116. Little did he apparently predict this take-over
would end up forcing his company to withdraw for the business entirely in the 1950s. In fact,
involvement of commercial banks in the personal loan business had been a goal of social reformers
from the early stages of their actions. Arthur Ham, the ﬁrst head of the Department of Remedial
Loans at the RSF, always kept that idea in mind, and the small loan framework had been, at
least in the beginning, a second best option seeing that banks were not ready to enter this ﬁeld
117
114Certiﬁcate of Incorporation, Household Finance Corporation, October 9 1928, RSF Box 82 Folder "Policy
and ﬁnancial structure 1928"
115Walter B. French, Conﬁdential note, 1942. RSF, box 100 Folder ABA.
116Burr Blackburn, "Does 6% Mean 6 %", Banking, journal of the ABA, March 1st 1939.
117"At the time of the Foundation's ﬁrst studies of loan shark operations, it was realized that one of the reasons
for the anti social lending practices was the unwillingness of banks to make consumer loans in small sums on
undesirable collateral". "In the face of this unwillingness,[...] the Department had to rely upon the development
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It seems quite contradictory that, on the one hand, banks thought they could improve their
degraded image by investing the ﬁeld of personal loans, and at the same time that they could
use their status as a way to establish a legitimate form of lending to the individual consumer.
However, there is diﬀerence between status and image, and even though credit was generally
frowned upon after the ﬁnancial débâcle of 1929, banks still carried an elevated status, at least
compared to small loan, money lenders. The idea of servicing the "community", "the little
people"118, was precisely at the intersection of a search for a higher status and a struggle to
build a legitimate form of business.
In summary, in the 1930s, many commercial bankers believed they were were supposed to
become the legitimate providers of personal loans to consumers. For business reasons : as deposit
institutions, they could oﬀer better terms then small loan lenders, and an discount rate of 6%
soon emerged as the industry standard. But also for symbolic reasons, as banks believed they
had a responsibility in providing for the ﬁnancial needs of their "community", which so far had
been poorly endorsed by regulated small loan lenders. As Walter French, head of Consumer
Credit at the ABA, put it : "[w]hen the investment and loan situation became critical for banks
in the early thirties, consumer lending was recognised formally by a great many banks, and what
had been, up to that time, an unproﬁtable business, became not only a proﬁtable venture but a
ﬁne public relations activity".
4.3 Distinct commercial practices, narratives and clients : are bankers
money-lenders ?
BE Henderson, president of HFC, stated in 1939 that "[p]ersonal loans departments compete
with small loan companies, to be sure, but the competition has been limited. The bank is and
must be highly selective in its choice of costumers and has invaded only the borders of the
small loan company's ﬁeld of service" 119. PLDs and regulated small loan lenders apparently
operated over separate "spheres of commerce" [Anteby, 2010], and this was seen as both a fact
and a necessity. Indeed, on the one hand, their products were not tailored to the same type
of customers, and on the other, personal Loans were supposed to be deﬁned (both technically
and symbolically) as a legitimate banking activity, and not a money lending business. John B.
of specialized institutions to supply the demand for small personal loan [...]. Mr Ham continued to believe,
however, that there would be a day when banks would enter the personal loan ﬁeld". Memorandum, Rolf Nugent
to Mr. Harrison, April 27 1943. RSF Box 99 Folder "Rate controversy discussion RSF".
118op. cit.
119"Does 6% Mean 6%" op. cit.
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Paddi's address of in front of Michigan bankers came as an illustration of this endeavor. In 1937,
he underlined the very good progress of the Personal Loans business, which now operated over a
"digniﬁed plane" thanks to the involvement of commercial banks : "[t]he term "loan shark" was
coined to designate a group of individuals not accepted among bankers, who were supposed to
prey, and often did, on individuals who found themselves in ﬁnancial need outside what was then
considered the realm of legitimate banking"120. This vision emphasized a new interpretation of
the "loan shark" label : banks here appear to be the "moral entrepreneurs"[Becker, 2008], they
decided on the legitimacy of personal loans ; the institutional reference point was no longer the
regulated small loan business, but the banking industry. Banks had extended their commercial
jurisdiction to individual consumers, and personal loans had been included, deﬁned as a banking
practice, not simply a money-lending activity.
Much of the banks' organizational choices can be analyzed through this double prism, and
the necessary deﬁnition of diﬀerent "practices of trade"[Anteby, 2010], and bankers used three
channels to separate their activities from loan sharks and regulated small loan lenders alike. First
of all, banks pushed for an adoption of a "discount" method to report the cost of loans, and this
was seen as a way to avoid the use of annual interest rates. Secondly, "client diﬀerentiation" [Ab-
bott, 2014] was also used to insure the legitimacy of the business, and the "worth" of unaﬀected
unsecured consumer lending. Finally, they developed a new model of "unsecured" lending, based
not only on future wages, but on a co-maker plan which required the loan to be endorsed by two
additional wage earners. As an illustration, Figure 4 displays an advertising ﬂier for a New York
based national bank, which bears the diﬀerent features presented hereafter.
Discount factor over interest rates: The most debated question during the take-over of
commercial banks, concerned the method used to report costs and charges. Despite the opposition
among bankers on this issue in the mid 1930s, most of them would adopt the discount method
in the 1940s, especially after the endorsement and the strong eﬀorts from the ABA in favor of
this practice 121.
Historically, commercial banks used a discount rate to report costs of their commercial credit,
which meant that these costs would be charged as a initial withdrawal on the loan. If a loan
contract is signed for a principal of $100 at a 6% discount, the borrower is given $94 initially,
and he or she simply has to pay back this sum in equal installments. Small Loan Lenders, as we
120John B Paddi, Address delivered at the Convention of Michigan Bankers Association at Mackinac Island,
June 1st 1936.RSF, Box 98 Folder Publicity 1936
121ABA, "Digest of Model Law", September 1942. RSF, Box 100 Folder ABA.
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Figure 4: Manufacturers Trust Company, ﬂyer advertising for personal loans, 1936. RSF Box
105 Folder "Individual Banks, Manufacturers Trust Company"
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have seen, were relying on a ﬁxed annual interest rates on the remaining balance : the cost of
the loan was dependent on the history of payments, but the interest rate would remain the same
as long as some payment was due. In the case of a discount factor, as the cost is paid at the
initial period, calculating an equivalent annual interest rate depends on the length of the loan
: the shorter the maturity, the higher the rate. If a loan is repaid after one month, the initial
6% discount would actually be a 6% monthly interest rate, hence a much higher annual rate ; if
on the contrary the loan lasted for several years, the interest rate would be much lower. Loans
were usually made for a year, and in that case a 6% discount is equivalent to a 11.7% annual
interest rate 122. Banks justiﬁed the use of the discount factor to show the proximity of personal
loans to more traditional commercial banking practices. John Paddi argued that Personal loans
were not very diﬀerent from business loans, and should hence adopt a similar method to report
cost, "[t]here is no great diﬀerence in the credit which may be extended to a salaried man or
to a business man, as both types of loans are based on the ability to repay a certain amount
at a speciﬁc time. One relies on the future of his business, and the other on his future salary.
More generally, interest rates still seemed to point to usury and money lending, and framing the
costs diﬀerently was a way to further assert this symbolic separation from small loan lenders -
see Figure 4, "Cost of Loan".
Also, this was a way to artiﬁcially lower the reported percentage, as compared to reporting
annual interest rates, and bankers saw this as a way to further diminish the potential stigma
on personal loans 123. In particular, as we said earlier, general usury caps in the United States
usually revolved around 8% in most States, and using a 6% discount factor was a way to remain
under this legal and symbolic threshold, even if these "percentages" didn't represent the same
quantitative measure. Cognitively, it was argued that this would increase the PLD status and
chances to "get business" 124, but such a percentage was also a way to justify that these new
lending practices required no regulation from the federal, or State authorities. A note from the
Federal Reserve Board on the "Statutory Authorization for PLD of National Banks" states that,
in 1937, "the legal status of these transactions is exceedingly hazy","most banks have sought to
avoid interest rate restrictions by the device of discounting interest at the maximum legal rate
122"Pro and con on the 6% discount for personal loans", American Banker, March 12 1940. Kenton Cravens,
Chairman of the ABA Consumer credit council, "Consumer credit prospects", Banking, 1943
123Mr. Stewart, President of Miami Deposit Bank, in Yellow Spring OH: "6% is not 11.7%", Banking, April 1st
1941
124"6% is not 11.7%", op. cit.
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on the face value of the note" 125, which shows the ﬂexible meaning of the word "rate". This led
to an intense ﬁght between bankers professional associations, legislatures and small loan lenders,
but in 1943 commercial banks succeeded in securing their right to report discount factors on
personal loans 126. It is interesting to recall that similar plans to report costs according to a
discount rate at face value, which would vary according to the length of the loan, were part of
the "salary buyers'" proposal to legally regulate their business in the 1920s: contrary to banks,
they didn't seem to have the necessary legitimacy to impose a non interest-based report method.
Client diﬀerentiation and status hierarchy: Andrew Abbott [2014], in his System of Pro-
fessions, argues that within a professional ﬁeld, status hierarchy and power distribution often
proceeds, at least partly, through client diﬀerentiation. The specialization of small loan lenders
on higher classes of borrowers was, as we have seen, to a large extent an unforeseen consequence
of the regulation process which wouldn't recognize as legitimate a particular spectrum of prac-
tices, and in particular smaller, unsecured lending. The social justice purpose at the origin of
the small loan reforms probably accounts best for the invisibility of such a segmentation to the
actors of the process : arguing that secure chattel lending was more legitimate than unsecured
salary loans because it was targeting higher social classes of the population was unacceptable
to the reformers. This contradiction was much less of a constraint for banks, whose Personal
Loans Departments very early recognized that they would oﬀer their services only the higher
classes of borrowers. One commentator goes as far as taking pride in the fact that clients of
PLDs are "the cream of the community"127. Right after this statement, the banker underlined
the disappointment of his board of directors in his PLD's early result, not regarding proﬁt or
default rates, as those were on the contrary encouraging, but regarding the fact that "unsecured
personal loans [...] have been made to people with lower incomes than they had hoped for. They
had anticipated reaching corporation executives, department heads and high grade professional
people". The average loan made by the bank during the preceding year has been around $150,
hence a relatively high level with respect to earlier small loan standards. However, the bank's
board is looking to increase this average to $250 by the following year, and "they are still hopeful,
and the next eﬀort will be to prepare advertising that will reach that class of people".
Although additional quantitative research will be needed to estimate the long term eﬀect of
these early institutional choices, three objective trends can be mentioned at this point. First
125RSF Box 98, Folder National Banks
126"Memorandum, RN Nugent to Mr Harrison", op. cit.
127"Income advances A better name for loans, The Bankers Monthly, May 1st 1936.
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of all, the average amount loaned by Personal Loan Departments of banks was much higher
than what had been done by regulated small loan lenders : it seems to oscillate around $300
128, although we were not able to gather enough data to represent the entire distribution of
loans. Secondly, the socio-occupational characteristics of personal loan borrowers diﬀered from
the earlier proﬁles of small loan borrowers. Louis Hyman has studied the employment situation
of customers of the PLD of two large New York banks in 1937. According to him, "[f]rom
the available information, it is clear that the majority of borrowers were the new middle-class of
white-collar employees (salesmen, government employees, clerical workers, and professionals) and
businessmen. Personal loan departments, although they did not exclude workers, were, unlike
small loan companies or remedial lenders, primarily aimed at middle-income more working-class-
oriented small loan companies." 129. Respectively 64 and 74 % of the banks' customers were
salaried clerical employees, salesmen, or government professionals, while only 12 and 14% of the
customers were skilled workers or foremen. And even if Hyman mentions that "the racial and
gender limits of that new middle class limited access to the personal loans as well", a study of
the precise impact of these institutional choices on the intersectional proﬁle of PLD borrowers
remains to be done. Finally, we have included as an Appendix data on the number of PLDs and
the total amount of loan made by State for the year 1936, which was available only for a limited
number of States. There are very large State diﬀerences in the development of PLDs, and this
unequal distribution seems to match the early divisions identiﬁed in Figure 3 130, with PLDs
developing mostly in the North East and the Midwest.
However, status distinction and client selection need to be understood within the broader
eﬀort to deﬁne Personal Loans as a legitimate banking practice. In particular, bankers discussed
128This stark increase was visible nation-wide, despite important geographic diﬀerences. In New York, a report
shows that the average loan made by PLDs was $417, and that most loans under $300 are "unproﬁtable" to banks.
In San Francisco, Bank of America reports an average of $300, and in Nebraska this ﬁgure is lower and amounted
to $ 164. Finally, in Illinois, loans under $500 represented only "2 to 3%" of the overall amount of personal loans
made by commercial banks. See respectively,"The Todd Company presents a personal loan system for banks",
1937. RSF, Box 98 / Folder operating techniques ; "These forms aid in handling Small loan at a proﬁt", Bankers
Service Bulletin, March 1st 1931 ; EN Van Horne, "PLD in Banks" The Midwestern Banker, June 1st 1936 ;
Chicago Banker, March 14 1936. These ﬁgures are stated in real terms, but converting them in 1917 dollar would
only imply a an 8.6% decrease from a 1940 value.
129[Hyman, 2011], p 95.
130As an example, in 1936 there were 1 PLD in Alabama, 3 in Florida 7 in Louisiana, which respectively made
out, for the year 1936, $14 000, $176 000 and $621 000 in loans. As a comparison for the same year, there were
31 PLDs in Indiana, 36 in Massachusetts and 152 in New Jersey, which handled a yearly amount of respectively
$4 109 000, $13 983 000 and
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extensively the way these new departments would be integrated in their already existing institu-
tions, and many of them argued that an important step would be to make no distinction between
their lending and saving practices. "As a matter of delicacy, no signs such as "Industrial Loan
Department" are displayed at the desks of the assistant cashiers where these applications are
ﬁlled out. 'Supposed a neighbor woman saw a friend of hers making a loan application here and
reported that 'Mrs. Casey must be hard up, because I saw her borrowing money at the bank
said Mr Sell, [...] That is why we pass up any signs for the department. Any one of the three
men at these desks can receive applications, and payments may be made at several windows in
the bank, just exactly as any usual deposits are made" 131. Nevertheless, banks didn't want to
restrict their business to their already existing customers ; hence the goal was to tie as much as
possible credit operations with existing saving practices. Many banks required that loans would
be paid by depositing the money on a savings accounts, which would be emptied at maturity to
repay the loan 132. This would encourage borrowers to become savers, and the acquisition of this
thrift habit was one of the condition at which personal loans would be beneﬁcial to consumers
133. According to the president the a bank based in Ohio quoted above : "this savings feature is
one in which the First Trust and Savings Bank of Canton takes real pride, for it has enabled and
encouraged many borrowers to start regular savings accounts, and so has brought the bank reg-
ular customers formerly unaccustomed to dealing with the bank"134. Even though this business
model based on an association of saving and lending practices was not adopted by all Personal
Loan Departments 135, the general concern with status hierarchy and client diﬀerentiation has
had a strong impact on the type of loans made and the range of customers which had access to it.
Loans were supposed to be made to the segment of borrowers which would indeed build a long
term relationship, through savings with the bank ; "personal loans" had to remain exceptional,
a one shot transaction which would transition borrowers into more common bank patrons.
131D.J. Defoe "Helps them get on their feet", The Burroughs Clearing House, September 1927
132William Trufant Foster "Consumer Loans by Commercial Banks", Pollak Foundation Pamphlet n 40. RSF,
Box 98, Folder Publicity 1940.
133A commonly found idea is that such a plan would accustom new borrowers to regular banking practices. One
commentators argues: "scientists tells us that an act repeated with regularity 45 times becomes a habit", hence
borrowers would become savers provided they have made payments a suﬃcient number of times. "The salary
loans movement spreads", HH Reinhard, ABA Journal, May 1st 1929
134"Helps them get on their feet", op. cit.
135Letter, Leon Henderson to Weinstock, VP of bank, against this "beautiful theory" that borrowing will increase
thrift, May 6 1929. Box 105 Folder Individual Banks, Louisville National Bank and Trust Co.
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Personal Loans as a legitimate form of "exceptional" unsecured lending : salary
loans and the co-maker plan: Banks adopted a model of "unsecured lending", which was
legitimized both through speciﬁc narratives built around the "exceptionality of the loans", and
through speciﬁc collateral requirements which set them aside from loan sharks and small loan
lenders alike. Regarding the latter, banks insisted very early on on an diﬀerent business model
than the one which regulated small loan lenders had been dwelling upon : they wanted to provide
"salary loans" 136, which was seen as the general, natural form consumer lending should adopt
in a capitalist, wage-earning society. "For centuries, the earning capacity of property was high;
that of labor low. The gradual increase in wages paid to labor, particularly to skilled labor, has
been one the most important factors in the eventual development of lending for consumptive
purposes137. This goes with the aforementioned idea than personal loans and commercial loans
needed to be assimilated in terms of their purposes and form. The president of a national bank
based in Minneapolis suggested that "income advances" would be "a better name for loans",
and should hence be used, both in ﬁnancial advertisements and internal documents such as loan
applications, to "emphasize the true nature of commercial loans" 138. "Too many people [...], had
the idea in some years not so long past, that bank loans were based upon the value of property
owned, regardless of income. All banks know that this is not a true basis for commercial loans.
As a matter of fact, it should never be considered as a basis for any loan. No bank wants to sell
the property of the borrower in order to get the money to liquidate the loan. "Income advances",
emphasize both to the loan oﬃcer and to the borrower, than an income must me known to exist
out of which the payment will be made" 139.
Interestingly, the organizational archives of PLDs never mention procedures of wage assign-
ments, which, in bankers' vision, was a very stigmatized practice 140. Indeed, PLDs would put
forward a diﬀerent security requirement in order to by-pass the prejudice attached to a practice
still associated with "loan sharks" : they asked for two co-makers to co-sign the loan, who, in case
of default and judicial proceedings, would be also be held responsible for the debt contracted.
136"The salary loans movement spreads", op. cit.
137John B Paddi, op. cit.
138"Income advances" A better name for loans, op. cit.
139Idem
140In a early note published by a banker which distinguishes loans made by banks and money lenders, Arthur
E. Hill mentioned that the "plan" does not require the signature of a wage assignment contract "for any of the
signers, which eliminates a certain feeling of embarrassment among the better class of borrowers". Letter, Arthur
E. Hill, manager of the Chicago First State Industrial Bank, to RL. Crampton, Illinois Bankers Association,
December 6 1916. RSF, Box 150 Folder Early History Chicago.
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This was seen as a way to rely on the wage-earner's network to insure good settlement of the
claim, and alleviate the burden bearing on his own private income. We found traces of this idea
as early as 1914, when a bank based in Atlanta had tried to make loans to consumers, "lend-
ing money on the security of labor". The writer's reﬂections on the experiment exposed in the
clearest way possible the moral ideals behind the co-maker plan, and its joint legitimization of
wages as legitimate securities: " The moral eﬀect on a man of his obligations to his endorsers is
one of the surest means of keeping him up to the the mark, moreover, making him a responsible
citizen [...] An employee of a newspaper, who was constantly in debt to the sharks and who had
become hopeless and irresponsible, borrowed from the bank enough to cancel his loans. Nine
of his fellow workers went on his note, so that he had practically his entire oﬃce behind him.
That man braced up, met every payment, climbed aboard the water wagon, and was restored
to to his former usefulness as an employee. Moreover, the more widely this bank and similar
banks become known among the working classes, the more working men will feel that their hon-
est labor is a ﬁnancial security for themselves and their fellows, without taint of charity, and
the sounder their endorsements will become. The bank has thus one of the great advantages of
the cooperative loan system in specialized industries, without the patronizing features of loans
systems conducted by employers". The co-maker plan was seen by bankers as a way to deﬁne
personal loans as a banking activity in its own right, separated from the money lending business,
as service to the community of wage earners.
Attached to this security requirement was an ambiguous narrative which described personal
loans, not as form of structural indebtedness but a loan made for "sound investment purposes"141,
or to face a temporary emergency 142. Stanley Wilson, the head of the PLDs of Bank of America
in the city of San Francisco distinguishes between borrowers who, despite their use of a personal
loan "usually needed for an emergency", manage to "maintain their good credit standing", and
"the chronic borrower, continually living beyond his means. It is our policy to eliminate this
type as fast as possible as we feel that no constructive good can come of retaining this individual
in consuming debt" 143.
141Cornelius Clark, Missouri Saving Bank and Trust Co. "Personal Loans, A specialty Requiring Special Equip-
ment", The Banker's monthly Chicago, November 1st 1932
142A ﬂyer advertising for the new personal loan service oﬀered by the Manufacturers Trust Company of New York
(See Hyman [2011] for details about the speciﬁc history of this company) reads : "No matter how carefully you
plan your personal, family, or business budget, emergencies will often arise which require that you obtain ready
cash. In such circumstances, you should not hesitate to apply for a personal loan at this bank" (Advertisement,
New York Sun, June 25 1935).
143"These forms aid in handling Small loan at a proﬁt", Bankers Service Bulletin, March 1st 1931.
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This exceptional nature of the loan was a way to insure the positive eﬀect of personal loans
on their borrowers trajectories. Many bankers wanted to avoid dealing with borrowers with
previous indebtedness, and frowned upon loans applications made, aﬀected to, continuous debt
consolidation purposes. A Kansas City banker assesses the business of his PLD after two years
of operation : 42% of borrowers come to the bank "already in debt", "which is a liability of an
uncertain character for a bank borrower to have". So far, "only 30% of total loans are made for
home equipment or sound investment purposes", and these number convinced the author that
"commercial banks can aﬀord to handle small loans to families in the higher-earning classes",
while dealing with "small borrowers" is more complicated, as "almost always a series of advances
and add-ons are necessary to bring [him] entirely out into the clearing of debt-free existence".
This was an ambiguous narrative because the idea was to retain wage-earning borrowers, but as
future savers, and avoid renewals of personal loans as much as possible, as these echoed earlier
money lending practices. The data which we have managed to gather on operations of Personal
Loan Departments tend to show that this was more an ideal than an actual banking practice,
most loans were made to consolidate existing debt, and a large part of the business was made
oﬀ of long term borrowers who renewed their loans. Very few banks report on the credit history
of their own borrowers, but as an example, 60% of loans made by the Louisville National Bank
and Trust Company in 1929 are made to previous borrowers, and this number is brought to 75%
if co-makers of these previous loans are included 144. In 1928, the ﬁrst PLD, opened by the
National City Bank of New York [Hyman, 2011], reported that 45% of its loans were made to
pay for "medical and dental services", or to "pay debts and loans" 145. Similarly 50% of loans
made by Bank of America in San Francisco in 1931 are either for "medical and dental services",
or to meet "outstanding obligations" 146. In 1936, the Underwriter Trust Company made 52% of
their loans for purposes of either "consolidating debt" or "paying urgent bills", such as merchant
or medical bills.147.
144Adress, E. Weinstock, Vice President of Louisville National Bank and Trust Company, in Birmingham AL,
1929. RSF, Box 105, Folder Individual Banks.
145Purposes of loans, ﬁrst year of operation, National City Bank, New York, 1928. RSF, Box 104 Folder Statistics
/ Occupations of borrowers
146"These forms aid in handling Small loan at a proﬁt", op. cit.
147RSF, Box 104 Folder Statistics / Occupations of borrowers.
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5 Conclusion
Both democratic candidates to the party primaries, Bernie Sanders148 and Hilary Clinton149,
have accused major US banks of having lost their "community" purposes. Baradaran [2015], in
her recent book, argued similarly than banks have, since the 1970s, broken the social contract
morally tying them with the American Nation since the early concerns expressed by Thomas
Jeﬀerson150: they were given a legitimate statute as the nation's leading ﬁnancial intermediary,
but in return their priority was to be given to the people 151. It is interesting to see the parallel
with the post-1929 crisis reaction of commercial banks : bankers, at the time, sought out new ways
of reaﬃrming their role as providers of ﬁnancial services to the "communities", and developing
Personal Loans to consumers seemed the best way to do so. Today, these reﬂections are not
impulsed by the banking sector, but by politicians and academics who point to the deregulation
period of the 1970s to explain this separation between banks and "the little people". Our research
seems to show that, despite the impact of the ﬁnancial reforms carried in the 1970, the model
of consumer loans used by commercial banks was already established in the 1940s. This is not
simply to point to a diﬀerent original point in time, but to emphasize the highly restrictive model
used by PLDs to develop their business of consumer lending. Personal loans were never thought
as a service accessible to everyone, they intended to serve the borrowers which would turn a
proﬁt, but also those for which these services would be helpful: the less secured the collateral
requirements, the more segmented the market.
The market for small loans underwent drastic changes in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, ﬁrst
from a largely unregulated set of practices to a semi-philanthropic regulation which established for
the ﬁrst time licensed small loan lenders specialized in unaﬀected loans of money. This political
and economic movement was able to achieve some legal regulation, and take over a segment from
the unregulated loan sharks. However, the stigma on money loaned in small amounts was only
partially lifted, and this was achieved at the cost of specializing on loans of relatively higher
amounts, made exclusively on chattel property. In a second phase beginning in the mid 1930s,
commercial banks furthered accomplished this separation between legitimate and illegitimate
148http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/washingtonbureau/2015/05/community-bankers-back-bernie-
sanders-bill.html
149http://time.com/3891520/hillary-clinton-community-banks/
150"There is no doubt Thomas Jeﬀerson would have been just as uncomfortable with our current bifurcated
nationwide banking systems (one for the rich and one for the poor) as he was with a big-city banking monopoly
that left out poor rural farms", [Baradaran, 2015] p. 6
151Idem, chapter 2.
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small loans: the model put forward by PLDs was not indirectly segmenting the market through a
social earmarking of collateral, it was directly selecting loans based on the borrowers' status, both
as a wage earner and as part of a wage earning community. The evolution described here cannot
be reduced to a illegitimate economic practice which was made legitimate through the conscious
or unconscious eﬀort of market actors. This operated through a selection of acceptable market
practices, and the market itself was morally shaped by these legitimacy struggles. The moral
making of the market calls for a broader understanding of discourses in market construction :
rather than a set of narratives, ideologies or marketing strategies, discourse practices participate
in the making of the economic and cannot be detached from the "market", in an ontological
sense. Conceptualizing more precisely the channels through which morals operate would require
additional empirical studies of diﬀerent cases, and in this paper we have emphasized one market
eﬀect of moral struggles, which operated through the construction of a legitimate business supply.
The production of moral classiﬁcations, not as general abstract categories, but enacted in day-to-
day business and legal practices, had major eﬀects on the structure of small loan borrowers, and
the frontier between legitimate and illegitimate practices created a segmentation of the small loan
market along social, racial and geographical lines. It is essential to stress the importance of the
latter: empirically, even though this phenomenon is very rarely noticed by reformers and lenders
alike, contemporary research [Peterson and Graves, 2005, Stegman, 2007] has shown the strong
spatial logics dividing the credit industry today, and the present research shows that these trends
were already on the way from the beginning of the regulation of this form of consumer lending.
Whether or not this divide matches the contemporary segmentations of the credit industry is
a question which extends the scope of this article. Answering this would, as we said in our
introduction, require a clariﬁcation of these categories, the type of practices they describe as
well as their normative underpinnings. Theoretically, this suggest that more attention needs to
be put on the "loci" of moral struggles : in the case of credit regulation, most of the reforms
we carried through the State legislatures and implemented at the local, making it diﬃcult to
consider the development of a moral market on a general level. Drawing more links between the
"culture", and the set of practices we refer to as the "economy" requires a better understanding
of how legitimacy conﬂicts are waged, in speciﬁc social and legal spaces.
The "worth" of the market for unsecured lending, was deﬁned across the ﬁrst half of the
20th century through to two major axes. Security requirements were a ﬁrst major dimension
: salary loans were for a long time highly illegitimate, and seen as inferior loans, as compared
to those made on chattel mortgages. But, as commercial banks took over the market through
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status entry, they were able to impose a legitimate for of unsecured lending, which added the
feature of the co maker plan to the sole reliance on a borrower's income. We have emphasized the
social earmarking of credit collateral, yet this was far from an ad hoc process : status conﬂicts
and power relations between the diﬀerent market actors governed the categories of legitimacy.
Client selection was a second trend, again, with two possible readings : status diﬀerentiation
deﬁnitely played a role in this process, but one could also look at this as a indirect way to control
the aﬀectation of money. If purchases cannot be monitored or known in advance, restricting
loans to the segment of costumers which are thought to behave thriftily was a way of insuring
that the money would be put to good use. Unsecured loans -taking as collateral the future
income of the borrower- as a general form of unaﬀected consumer credit, ﬁnally acquired the
legitimacy it had failed to build in the early decades of the century, and this was very much
due to the status entry of commercial banks. The various restrictions on legitimate lending
transactions, to sound, exceptional loans, contracted to ﬁnance a family investment or face an
unbudgeted emergency, opposed to structural indebtedness, can be read as attempts to aﬀect the
potential uses of unaﬀected money. The next major evolution of the consumer lending industry
will be the development of credit card debt and unsecured credit lines [Hyman, 2011, Trumbull,
2014] in the post-war context. It would be interesting to study how this form of structural
indebtedness became a legitimate market practice, in view of the results of this research. Indeed,
even commercial banks wanted to avoid permanent loans, and excluded the clients who were
seeking these types of services: the stigma associated with loan sharks and loans for the poor
still tainted loans where the principal was not gradually repaid on a ﬁxed scheduled of instalment
payments. Permanent credit, renewed period after period with small, ﬁxed, charges, was alien
to both regulated lenders and commercial bankers alike.
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Appendices
A Accronyms and Records
Accronyms :
• AASLB American Association of Small Loan Brokers
• ABA American Banker Association
• AHC Atlanta History Center
• AJC American Journal and Constitution
• FHA Federal Housing Authority
• HFC Household Finance Corporation
• NFRLA National Federation of Remedial Loan Associations
• PLD Personal Loan Departments (of commercial banks)
• RSF Russell Sage Foundation
• USLL Uniform Small Loan Law
Major Archive Funds:
• Russell Sage Foundation Collection, Library of Congress, Washington DC and Special Records,
Rockefeller Foundation, Sleepy Hollow.
• Atlanta History Center, Atlanta, Georgia.
• Georgia Archives, Morrow, Georgia.
• Household Finance Corporation Collection, HSBC Archives, Brooklyn NY.
• Atlanta Fulton Public Library, newspapers and magazines collections.
• Chicago History Museum.
• Company Records, Birmingham Public Library, Alabama.
• New York Public Library and Columbia University Archives.
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B Maps and data construction
B.1 Salary Buyers
Lists of oﬃces presumably belonging to the Big Four salary buyers are regularly published in newspapers
and internal documents issues by the Foundation. We have also included other chains of agencies, using
every information we could ﬁnd at the city, County or State level (and aggregated them at the State
level), keeping in mind that individual agencies are more diﬃcult to track, as they raised less public
attention than larger chains. These documents were very numerous, for examples of lists of salary
buying oﬃces, see
• Unlicensed lenders in Minneapolis, 1926 1927, RSF, Box 123. Folder Outstanding loan balances
1923-1943.
• Principal salary buyers in Macon. RSF, Box 16 Legislative Campaign 1926.
• Salary buyers in Atlanta GA, 1926. RSF Box 16 Loan Shark Campaign 1927 Folder (Boyd)
• List of salary buyers in Chicago. RSF, Box 17, Folder 1926 Salary Buying.
B.2 Licensed lenders
Some States required their banking authorities to record statistics relative to licensed small loan com-
panies, but not all of them, and it proved very hard to gather exhaustive data on all regulated lenders.
Before restricting our analysis to licensed members which held membership at the AASLB, we have
checked the State selection bias. Indeed, an under representation of regulated lenders in the South could
simply mean that small loan lenders licensed in the Southern States simply didn't join the national fed-
eration. This seemed to be marginally true, but there didn't seem to be any patterned bias. In Georgia
in 1921, there were 15 licensed lenders and only two of them joined the federation ; in Illinois during the
same year, there were 141 licensed lenders and 69 of them held membership. In Florida, there was one
license holder, and it held membership. Similarly, in 1929, when the sharks' leaders in the South, King
and Roesenbusch, decided to give in and accept the regulation of their business, they immediately joined
the national federation. It is ﬁrst interesting to notice that the National Federation was even more
concentrated in Northern and Midwestern States, and while it is true that the National Association
might have had trouble implementing a systematic membership policy in some states, we do not think
this would signiﬁcantly aﬀect the relative distribution of licensed lender and the high concentration of
these on the Chicago-New York belt. However, we also included a map of oﬃces held by HFC, which
grew more and more as a monopoly on regulated personal loans in the 1930s and 1940s, and provide
a diﬀerent sample of agencies countrywide. Finally, as mentioned earlier, small loan oﬃces had quite
standardized sizes, which suggests that the number of oﬃces is a good relative proxy for the overall level
of lending.
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C Distribution of Personal Loan Departments of Commer-
cial banks.
Reporting annual activity was not compulsory in every State, and we have used the results of an internal
study carried by Rolf Nugent 1936, who personally sent out inquiries to every PLD manager in the
country for them to send back data about their loan amounts. These have been complied for the
available States.
State Number of Departments Total amount loaned (in thousands dollars)
Alabama 1 14
Florida 3 176
Georgia 18 1983
Illinois 21 1370
Indiana 31 4109
Kentucky 19 3604
Louisiana 7 621
Massachussetts 36 13983
Mississippi 1 154
New Jersey 152 11782
Table 1: Personal Loan Departments, activity by State. Source: RSF, Box 103 Folders State
Statistics.
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